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ABSTRACT 
Despite its military defeat, and the collapse of its so-called caliphate in 2018, the 
Islamic State has seemingly expanded to several other areas around the world. This thesis 
develops a theory of unconventional warfare to examine why and how the Islamic State 
has expanded outside of its core area in Iraq. This study reveals that the Islamic State’s 
expansion fits within its stated ideology to create an Islamic caliphate and that it has done 
so by using methods that were evaluated and tested in Iraq. Through the sponsorship of 
Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, Islamic State-Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, and Islamic 
State-West Africa in Nigeria, the Islamic State conducted unconventional warfare by 
leveraging control over the population, implementing organizational control, exploiting 
various opportunities, and providing external support to local jihadist organizations in 
order to establish recognized franchises in these locations. This research allows the 
reader to better understand why the Islamic State expanded outside of Iraq and offers 
insight into the methods and techniques used by the Islamic State to expand. 
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The war against the Islamic State (IS) is a global conflict. Since 2014, a 79-nation 
coalition has been at war with IS, a war that has seen fronts open up across the Middle East, 
Europe, Asia, and Africa.1 IS has grown into dozens of recognized wilayats (IS officially 
recognized provinces) and unofficial franchises around the world. IS has used its model of 
political-military success to expand outside of Iraq, which has drawn the interest of 
fledgling or struggling jihadist organizations worldwide.2 As early as 2013, IS deliberately 
acted to establish a branch in Syria. In January 2015, IS announced the establishment of 
IS-Khorasan: a wilayat consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Iran, and parts 
of India and Russia.3 In March 2015, a faction of Boko Haram in Nigeria officially became 
known as IS West Africa.4 In each of these cases, IS began planning and executing its 
expansion to these areas well before the collapse of the caliphate, and in some cases, before 
its announcement.5 
The debate about the IS’s expansion has resulted in several explanatory theories. 
Some believe that IS in not a state but rather, a terrorist organization and that controlling 
1 For the purposes of this research, I will use the name Islamic State (IS) or Islamic State-Central (IS-
Central) when referring to the core of the Islamic State organization. Franchises and other IS related entities 
will be addressed specifically. Literature and the press have commonly referred to the Islamic State as the 
following: ISIS for the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIL for the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and Daesh for the transliteration of the Arabic spelling of ISIL. Vera 
Mironova and Karam Alhamad, “The Names of Jihad,” Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-07-14/names-jihad. 
2 Jibran Ahmad and Mohammad Stanekzai, “Disenchanted Militants in South Asia Eye Islamic State 
with Envy - Reuters,” Reuters, January 21, 2015, sec. World News, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-southasia-insight/disenchanted-militants-in-south-asia-eye-islamic-state-with-envy-
idUSKBN0KU2VC20150121. 
3 Antonio Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian 
Jihad (London: Hurst & Company, 2018), 2. 
4 Robert Postings, “Nigeria’s Military Struggles with Islamic State: Part 1 – an Upsurge in Attacks,” 
The Defense Post, January 15, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/01/15/nigeria-military-struggles-
islamic-state-iswa-part-1-upsurge-in-attacks/. 
5 October 20, 2018 Coalition backed forces secured all of Raqqa, Syria, the capital of the IS caliphate. 
On March 23, 2019, Coalition backed forces announced that the last IS stronghold in Syria was captured.; 
Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls,” The New York Times, 
March 23, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/world/middleeast/isis-syria-
caliphate.html. 
2 
physical territory in the Middle East is not as important to the group as its expansion to 
new safe havens in other locations.6 Others believe that IS was a “Rogue State” and that 
its franchises and external branches have assumed the Islamic State’s now “Stateless 
Ideology.”7 Yet others would call IS expansion a side-show compared to its eventual 
reemergence on the internet through a virtual caliphate.8 While each argument has merit, 
much of the collective analysis fails to address why and how IS has expanded outside of 
its core area in Iraq. To answer these questions, we must examine and interpret IS as it truly 
sees itself—a state sponsoring a global Islamic insurgency.9 
The Islamic State is seeking to build an empire much like the Abbasid Caliphate 
(750–1258 AD) which, at its peak, ruled from Northern Africa to Afghanistan.10 In 2019, 
after the defeat of the physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria, IS cells and operations moved 
underground.11 IS has survived and thrived for over two decades and current indications 
show that the group continues to operate through their well-established networks within 
6 Jessica Anderson, “ISIS: State or Terror Group?,” Small Wars Journal, n.d., 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-state-or-terror-group; Barack Obama, “President Obama: ‘We 
Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL’” (Speech, September 10, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-
destroy-isil.  
7 Megan Specia, “The Evolution of ISIS: From Rogue State to Stateless Ideology,” The New York 
Times, March 20, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/middleeast/isis-history-
facts-islamic-state.html. 
8 Haroro J. Ingram and Whiteside, Craig, “In Search of the Virtual Caliphate: Convenient Fallacy, 
Dangerous Distraction,” War on the Rocks (blog), September 27, 2017, 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/in-search-of-the-virtual-Caliphate-convenient-fallacy-dangerous-
distraction/. 
9 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Syrian Rebel Groups Pulling in Foreign Fighters,” Aymenn Jawad 
Al-Tamimi (blog), December 24, 2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14190/the-syrian-rebel-groups-
pulling-in-foreign; “‘Clashing of the Swords’- New ISIS Nasheed from Ajnad Media,” June 18, 2014, 
http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/06/clashing-of-the-swords-new-isis-nasheed-from. 
10 William McCants, “Why ISIS Really Wants to Conquer Baghdad,” Brookings Markaz (blog), 
November 12, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/11/12/why-isis-really-wants-to-
conquer-baghdad/; Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
11 Syrian Democratic Forces declare victory over IS on March 22, 2019. Linda Givetash, “ISIS 
Defeated Say U.S.-Backed Forces, Declaring Total Victory in Syria,” NBC News, March 23, 2019, Online 
edition, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-backed-forces-declare-victory-over-isis-syria-n972401. 
3 
Iraq and Syria, despite military defeat.12 In April 2019, IS claimed responsibility for attacks 
in Sri Lanka, attempted a terror attack in Saudi Arabia, and successfully executed an attack 
against military forces in the border areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo.13 The 
Islamic State remains a lethal and agile enemy.14  
One way to better understand the Islamic State, is to analyze IS as a state executing 
unconventional warfare (UW).15 Using UW as a lens to examine IS provides us with the 
opportunity to understand many of its core activities and its organizational resilience. I 
argue that IS deliberately employed its own version UW to expand outside of Iraq and 
began doing so with its expansion to Syria in 2011. This research will provide insight into 
IS’s desire to expand, and, assess why and how IS conducts UW outside of its core areas 
in Iraq through an examination of three IS case studies; 1) IS operations in Syria in 2011, 
2) the establishment of IS-Khorasan in Afghanistan in 2014, and 3) the establishment of IS 
West Africa in Nigeria in 2015. These case studies were chosen for two reasons; 1) 
collectively, these cases provide examples of IS UW and expansion over a long period of 
time (2011-2019), and 2) they allow for the examination of IS UW practices in different 
geographic regions and varied demographic groups.   
The second section of this paper will examine the relevant literature on UW, 
insurgency, revolution, and IS strategy to develop a theory of UW that helps explain how 
IS develops an executes its UW strategy. Section three will look at the first recorded case 
of IS expansion and use of UW through its sponsorship of Jabhat al Nusra (JN) in Syria. 
 
12 “Operation INHERENT RESOLVE: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress,” 
Lead IG Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense, April 1, 
2019), pp. 2, 20, 42, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/06/2002167167/-1/-
1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF. 
13 Aymenn al-Tamimi and Charlie Winter, “ISIS Relaunches as a Global Platform,” The Atlantic, April 
27, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/the-sri-lanka-bombings-were-a-preview-of-
isiss-future/588175/. 
14 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State: Baqiya?,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (blog), May 
16, 2017, http://www.aymennjawad.org/19918/the-islamic-state-baqiya. 
15 The Joint U.S. doctrine definition of UW is “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with 
an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area.” A detailed discussion of UW will be 
followed in the next section of this thesis. US Army Training Circular 18–01.1 Unconventional Warfare 
Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha Level (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016), 1–1. 
4 
Section four will address IS expansion to Afghanistan and the establishment of IS-
Khorasan; Section five will look at IS-West Africa; and, finally Section six will discuss 
findings and conclusions.  
This thesis will not attempt to compare IS to other insurgent or revolutionary 
organizations. First, IS and the franchises this research examines are robust and unique 
compared to other potential peer groups. Additionally, IS’s establishment of franchises 
outside the Middle East and within varying cultures makes their model unique, flexible, 
and adaptable to diverse situations. Therefore, comparisons to other organizations exceed 
the scope of this thesis. Evaluations of organizations like Hezbollah would yield 
similarities in terms of types of operations, capabilities, and ability to govern; however, 
Hezbollah and IS are fundamentally different organizations.16 Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim 
organization and an extension of a state sponsor in Iran. Hezbollah has limited goals, 
mainly focused on establishing a legitimate presence in Lebanon in order to destroy the 
state of Israel. Hezbollah’s operations within the greater Middle East are in support of 
Iran’s political goals to disrupt competitors and threats.17 IS has a global agenda, no state 
sponsor, and has maintained the goal of being self-sufficient to prevent manipulation by 
external supporters. As a Sunni Salafist group, IS has access to much larger Muslim 
populations in more areas throughout the world making it more active in more locations.  
While a comparison to al Qaeda is useful, as it would compare and contrast 
arguably the two most significant extremist organizations of the last 20 years, this too 
would be outside the scope of this research. Even though IS was structurally and 
ideologically shaped by al Qaeda, IS now focuses on competing with and distinguishing 
itself from its predecessor. Both organizations are a part of the Salafi Jihad movement and, 
as mentioned previously, IS grew from al Qaeda in Iraq, but philosophical differences; 
such as IS’s use of extreme violence against other Muslims, the IS cultivation of a geo-
sectarian divide, and its desire to establish a caliphate right away, are among several of the 
 
16 For a more detailed discussion of Hezbollah see Sarah Cohler, “Hezbollah: Analysis of Violence,” 
American Diplomacy, March 2011, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2011/03/hezbollah-analysis-of-
violence/. 
17 Tony Badran, What Is Hezbollah? (PragerU, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8DX-
hjPYwjs. 
5 
reasons that forced the groups to split. and unwillingness to IS’s announcement of the its 
caliphate in 2014 propelled the group ahead of al Qaeda in terms of legitimacy, notoriety, 
funding, and recruiting.18 As Gerges explains, “ISIS is waging a two-pronged offensive to 
demolish the post–World War I ‘colonialist’ borders, and [to] gain leadership of the global 
jihadist movement. The rise of ISIS represents a generational and ideological rupture with 








18 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 228–33. 
19 Gerges, 236–37. 
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II. A THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Simply put, UW is the external sponsorship of revolutions, resistance movements, 
and insurgencies by international actors, to achieve the actor’s desired interests abroad.20 
While supporting revolutions, resistance movements, and insurgencies has a long history, 
UW, as a strategy, is uniquely relevant today because insurgency has surpassed interstate 
war as the most common form of armed conflict. These conflicts provide international 
actors with more ways of accomplishing their objectives, particularly when diplomacy is 
stalled, and without major military intervention, since indigenous irregular forces are 
employed.21  
The doctrinal U.S. military definition of UW is “activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”22 UW is an indirect approach to warfare and a tool of statecraft 
 
20 Maxwell states “ unconventional warfare at its core is about revolution, resistance, and insurgency 
(RRI) combined with the external support provided to a revolution, resistance, or insurgency by either the 
U.S. or others” David S. Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars 
Journal, accessed December 9, 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/do-we-really-understand-
unconventional-warfare.  
21 Insurgency is “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political 
control of a region.” An insurgency is a form of intrastate conflict. Interstate war is characterized as wars 
between states which are members of the international system. According to the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned, irregular forces include paramilitary organizations, guerillas, militias, gangs, mercenaries, or 
criminal networks. Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). xvii, Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 
4, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf?ver=2018-05-11-102418-000; 
Merideth Reid Sarkees, Inter-State Wars: Definitions and Variables, 4th ed. (Correlates of War Project, 
n.d.), http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/inter-state-wars-codebook.Paul et al., Paths to 
Victory; Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency, 4; Sarkees, Inter-State Wars: Definitions and 
Variables; Jenny Solon, ed., Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective, vol. 11–34, Newsletter (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2011), 
https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6698& filename=/docs/doc6698/11-34.pdf.  
22 “The current joint definition for UW as approved by the Commander of USSOCOM in October 
2009. USSOCOM’s proponent for UW is USASOC. The commanders of USSOCOM and USASOC could 
initiate the process to revise the definition at their discretion; however, until such time as any such revision 
is completed, this definition is authoritative. Moreover, the breakdown of the definition above is deliberate 
and unambiguous. The unclassified breakdown of the definition is verbiage taken verbatim from 
USSOCOM Directive 525–89, (U) Unconventional Warfare (S//NF). The components of the definition are 
likewise authoritative.” US Army Training Circular 18–01.1 Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning 
Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha Level, 1–1.  
 
8 
which accomplishes objectives through the core activities of subversion, sabotage, Guerilla 
warfare, and psychological operations to achieve three strategic outcomes: coercing, 
disrupting, or overthrowing an opposing government, regime, or state-like entity.23 In this 
context, UW employs special-purpose military personnel (advisors) partnered with 
indigenous personnel (underground, auxiliary, and guerillas) in their native territory 
(denied area) to seek a behavioral modification (coerce, disrupt) of an adversarial regime 
or occupier, or its removal (overthrow).24 The term UW is commonly used in a U.S. 
military context, specifically involving U.S. Army Special Forces, however, UW is not 
solely an American endeavor.25 Other nation states and, to an extent, non-state actors 
employ UW as a form of surrogate or proxy warfare in which they execute military 
operations to present adversarial regimes and groups with threats and dilemmas or to 
destabilize a region or state to build maneuver space for other operations and retain 
influence over a situation of interest.26 As David Maxwell writes, 
We are seeing variations of UW conducted by the Russians and their New 
Generation Warfare, the Chinese and their Three Warfares, and the Iranian 
Action Network. And finally, groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are conducting variations of UW (though ISIL 
might be said to have completed its UW campaign and is now functioning 
like a quasi-state).27 
 
23 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 105. “Unconventional Warfare Fundamentals,” The Irregular Warrior, September 
14, 2017, http://irregularwarrior.com/unconventional-warfare; Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 
105; U.S. Army Training Circular 18–01.1 Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the 
Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha Level, 2–53. 
24 “The Underground is a covert or clandestine, cellular element within the resistance or insurgency 
that can conduct political, military, or special purpose operations in areas denied to the Guerillas. The 
Guerillas are the overt, generally irregular military component of the insurgency. The Auxiliary are a 
portion of the civilian population providing active support to the resistance or insurgency by using their 
normal lives and occupations as a cover for their actions.” Department of Defense, Joint Publication 
3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015).  
25 The Joint definition of UW “includes activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating with an underground, 
auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” Department of Defense. I-2.  
26 Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (April 
2013): 40, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733. 
27 Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” 
9 
UW is versatile because it can be conducted in advance of or in support of a large-
scale conflict or as a stand-alone method of warfare. Unconventional Warfare can prepare 
the battlefield for the introduction of conventional forces using subversion, sabotage, and 
intelligence collection through and with indigenous counterparts.28 As a stand-alone effort, 
UW can take the form of a protracted behind-the-scenes war against the enemy.  
Aaron Zelin’s examination of IS territorial expansion draws considerable 
comparisons to UW. Zelin describes the IS model in two major phases, pre-territorial 
control and post-territorial control. During these phases IS executes five primary activities: 
intelligence, military, dawa (religious activities), hisba (secret or moral policing), and 
governance.29 IS intelligence activities focus on infiltrating, coopting, or sponsoring other 
organizations and groups, establishing cells to collect information on rivals, and learning 
the area. The military operations consist of asymmetric warfare such as car bombings, 
ambushes, assassinations, and roadside bombs. Success in military operations allows IS to 
begin controlling territory. Once in control of territory, IS implements its dawa initiatives 
which include, community outreach, religious education, and indoctrination. In 
conjunction with the dawa phase, IS conducts hisba activities to ensure the purity of Islam. 
Hisba activities consist of burning cigarettes and alcohol, destroying religious and historic 
artifacts, ensuring that civilian pray and abide by the laws instituted by IS. Lastly, IS begins 
governance operations in which the group develops a judicial body, levies taxes, and 
provides essential services.30  
Examination of UW concepts and the related literature reveal four critical pillars of 
UW: 1) external support, 2) the population, 3) organizational control functions, and 4) 
opportunities. 
 
28 Irwin chronicles the Jedburghs a Coalition Special Operations Unit during World War II, tasked to 
conduct Unconventional Warfare through indigenous partners behind enemy lines in support of Allied 
Major Combat Operations against the Nazis.Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied 
Special Forces, France 1944 (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 5–7, 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=729370.  
29 Aaron Y Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology,” The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy Research Notes, no. 29 (January 2016): 1. 
30 Zelin, 1–4. 
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A. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
The difference between insurgency or resistance movements and UW is the aspect 
of deliberate external support by an outside actor to achieve strategic endstates in and 
against adversarial states or occupying powers.31 A sponsor can leverage support to groups 
involved to influence the outcome of a conflict toward a favorable end. UW draws its roots 
from George Kennan’s concept of “political warfare”: 
Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time 
of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all 
the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such 
overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the 
Marshall Plan), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as 
clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological 
warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile 
states.32 
Similarly, a RAND report defines political warfare as “the intentional use of one or 
more of the implements of [national] power—diplomatic/political, information/cyber, 
military/intelligence, and economic—to affect the political composition or decision 
making in a state.”33 Both definitions of political warfare are broad and encompass many 
ways that actors can shape outcomes short of overt military operations. UW is also a broad 
concept, that can include a wide range of supporting, activities from providing overt 
political backing to the clandestine employment of advisors and contribution of funding, 
training, and equipment.  
 
31 According to Maxwell, occupying powers can be non-state actors or terrorist groups, controlling 
terrain within a country. Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?”  
32 George Keenan, “Policy Planning Staff Memo” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 
273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2., May 4, 1948), 
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm. 
33 Linda Robinson et al., “The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare,” Product Page 
(RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2019), 1, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071.html. 
11 
Providing sanctuary for insurgent groups can also be considered external support.34 
While Mao, Che, and Lenin did not specifically address external support in their work, all 
three benefited from external support during their campaigns. The Soviet Union provided 
Mao’s communist guerillas with materiel support during the Chinese Civil War, Mexico 
provided Che and Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement with training areas and safe haven 
as they prepared for their operations in Cuba, and Germany helped to fund the Bolsheviks 
and allowed Lenin safe passage back to Russia in 1919 in support of his efforts during the 
Russian Civil War. In these examples, each supporting state actor did so with the belief 
that its sponsorship of these individuals or groups would further its national interests. 
A sponsor’s decision to provide external support to a resistance or insurgent group 
is dependent on several factors and considerations within the target country or area. When 
weighing the decision to provide external support, a sponsor must also consider their 
overall strategy to ensure that the outcome of the sponsor’s involvement is consistent with 
its national interests. Without these considerations and a recognition of favorable 
conditions on the ground, the execution of UW may be an untenable course of action.35 
B. THE POPULATION 
Perhaps the most critical condition for successful UW is the support of a sizeable 
portion of the resident population within the target country or, at the very least, the ability 
to influence or coerce a large portion of the population.36 A population supportive of a 
government or change agent lends credibility and legitimacy to that group. Additionally, 
 
34 This chapter discusses “Safe Haven and Transit” as forms of external support in which neighboring, 
supporting states allow insurgents to seek sanctuary across borders. Daniel L Byman et al., “Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” in Assessing the Impact of External Support (RAND, 2001), 
13, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/congress/terrorism/phase2/insurgent.pdf.  
35 JP 3-05.1 and TC 18–01.1 discuss completion of a UW Feasibility Assessment during the decision 
planning for UW. The U.S. Feasibility Assessment addresses the presence of the following conditions as 
key for success 1) an indigenous partner willing to, capable of, and appropriate for U.S. support 2) 
favorable environmental and terrain conditions that provide the resistance or insurgency with suitable safe 
haven, 3) a portion of the relevant population within the country that is supportive of the resistance 
movement or insurgency, 3) a weakened or unconsolidated government or occupying power. Department of 
Defense, Joint Publication 3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare.  
36 Seth G Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare Lessons From the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New 
York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 2017), 38. 
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the population is key for identifying common grievances, developing shared ideology, and 
leveraging or extracting resources.  
1. Legitimacy  
Legitimacy, in the context of UW, encompasses the character or rightness of the 
parties involved but also speaks to the capabilities they each have. Supportive populations 
provide governments or groups with legitimacy through trust and action. If the population 
believes that their goals and interests will be met through the decisions and actions of the 
government, group, or organization they support, then they will offer their trust.37 Action 
follows trust. Action is the population’s willingness to conform to and obey rules and 
laws.38 Once the population trusts and acts on that trust, then the group or government 
gains legitimacy which, in turn, lends justification to their actions. UW seeks to build 
legitimacy of insurgent and resistance groups by eroding popular support of the adversary 
by challenging its legitimacy, ability to protect the people, and degrading its military 
capacity.  
In terms of how capabilities relate to legitimacy, Charles Tilly outlines “Four State 
Activities”: 1) war making, the capacity to eliminate external threats with an advantage in 
violence, 2) state making, the capacity to eliminate internal threats with a monopoly over 
organized violence, 3) protection, the capacity to eliminate the enemies of their clients 
(external and/or internal), and 4) extraction, acquiring a means of carrying out the first 
three activities.39 The capacity for states to execute each of these functions provides them 
with legitimacy in terms of how traditional state actors behave within the recognized 
international system.  
 
37 David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” British Journal of Political 
Science 5, no. 4 (1975): 447–48. 
38 Easton, 451; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 
1964), 382. 
39 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, 
ed. Peter Evans, Rueschemeyer Dietrich, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 181. 
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The rebel attack on the La Plata army outpost during the Cuban Revolution is an 
example of legitimacy shifting from the state government to the insurgency. The battle was 
a humiliating defeat for the Cuban military and, to avoid future losses, Batista’s forces 
withdrew from several smaller outposts across Cuba that were minimally manned and not 
easily defended, effectively ceding terrain to the insurgents.40 The attack demonstrated that 
Castro’s insurgency was capable of matching the Cuban military, thereby reaching 
capability parity with the state’s forces. The success of the attack coupled with the growing 
popular support for Castro throughout Cuba, showed that the insurgency was becoming the 
legitimate alternative to the government.  
2. Ideology 
While academia has seemingly countless definitions for ideology, Assaf 
Moghadam synthesizes the four characteristics common to most. First, ideologies create 
an “in-group” or collection of individuals with similar beliefs and economic, political, or 
social backgrounds. Next, ideology identifies the “out-group” or people perceived to be 
responsible for the problems experienced by the in-group. Third, ideology develops a group 
identity which encompasses the collective characteristics of those within the in-group. 
Lastly, ideology creates solutions to problems experienced by the in-group and advocates 
for action to effectively address them.41 Ideology in UW is critical because an ideology of 
resistance highlights the social, economic, or political problems which exist among the 
population and can be used to unify people around a cause.  
Additionally, Snow and Byrd’s work on cultural framing explains how ideology is 
developed and messaged internally and externally. Framing can be broken down in to three 
categories; diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing contributes to the 
in-group and the out-group creation in that it is deployed to identify a group’s problems 
and where or who to assign blame to for those problems. Prognostic framing develops 
concepts for what actions need to be taken to address the problem. Motivational framing 
 
40 Jose A. Moreno, “Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 4 (April 1970): 124–25. 
41 Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 3. 
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shapes group narratives to facilitate action.42 Ideology in UW is critical because it 
highlights grievances, i.e., the social, economic, or political problems which exist among 
the population and can be used to unify people around a cause.  
Theories of how agency and culture impacts revolutions speak to the importance of 
ideology within resistance movements and insurgencies. While some theories of revolution 
are based on structural causes such as, the relationships or conflicts between states and 
groups, Eric Selbin believes that “revolutions do not come, they are made” through the use 
of ideas, symbology, shared values, stories, and world views.43 
Other theorists highlight Marxist Communism, Socialism, or extremist 
interpretations of religion as the drivers for revolutionary action. In each case, the four 
characteristics of ideology are present. Marxism’s “two great hostile camps” created an in-
group out of the workers or proletariat who were exploited by the out-group capitalists or 
bourgeois.44 Marxist and Leninist in-group identities and revolutionary action proposals 
are also consistent. The proletariat is depicted as slave-like underdogs who must unite 
against their oppressors to seize power and change the system.45  
Extremist ideologies and interpretations of religion are complex and vary within 
and across groups. Additionally, these types of ideology can evolve or change over time 
depending on changes to external influences or internal group dynamics.46 Salafism for 
example, has many differences of opinions on revolutionary action proposals. Some 
groups, like al Qaeda and IS, believe that violence and terrorism must be used to achieve 
their endstate while other Salafists renounce the use of violence, particularly against 
 
42 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist 
Movements,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review 12, no. 1 (2007): 119–36. 
43 Eric Selbin, “Revolution in the Real World,” in Theorizing Revolutions: New Approaches from 
Across the Disciplines, ed. John Foran (Florence, United States: Routledge, 1997), 120, 128. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=179673. 
44 Karl Marx 1818–1883, The Communist Manifesto (London; Chicago, Ill. : Pluto Press, 1996., 1996), 
https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/999792955802121. 
45 Vladimir I. Lenin, “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” March 1913, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/mar/x01.htm; Marx, The Communist Manifesto. 
46 Snow and Byrd, 122. 
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innocent people. Salafi jihad creates a clear in-and out-group as well as a strict in-group 
identity consistent with its interpretation of Islam.47  
3. Grievances 
Grievances among the civilian population are necessary for resistance movements 
and insurgencies because they provide the means for groups to drive a wedge between the 
government and the population. Grievances come in many forms such as oppressive laws, 
ineffective government representation, lack of social justice, disparate economic 
conditions, and ethnic or religious persecution. Grievances are the basis for propaganda 
and information operations and an effective mobilization tool. Additionally, grievances can 
create passionate and emotional responses from the population, which, further drive 
revolution.  
Grievances are common to all revolutions. The French Revolution was in response 
to leadership failures and corruption by King Louis XVI, ineffective government 
institutions, economic disparity, and social strain.48 Intolerable working conditions, 
overcrowded urban centers, the decline of Russia internationally, and an autocratic 
government led to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.49 The Communist Revolutions in 
China were also heavily tied to popular grievances like land reform, the threat of foreign 
imperialism, cultural shifts away from Confucianism, and the Japanese occupation forces 
in northeastern China.50  
Contemporary revolutionary movements are also created and directed by 
grievances. al Qaeda’s campaign of global jihad was founded to return Islam to prominence 
internationally because of the belief that Muslims all over the world have been 
 
47 Michael W. S Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America, 2017, 18–21. 
48 William Doyle, The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions 54 
(Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
49 John Merriman, “The Romanovs and the Russian Revolution” (Lecture, September 2, 2009), 
https://oyc.yale.edu/history/hist-202/lecture-19. 
50 Timothy Cheek, Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents, 2002, 
https://link.springer.com/openurl?genre=book&isbn=978-1-349-63485-9.  
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marginalized and persecuted, particularly by the west or “far enemy.”51 In his 1996 fatwa, 
Osama bin Laden outlined al Qaeda’s grievances and declared war on the United States for 
its role occupying the “land of the two holy places.”52 al Qaeda saw U.S. intervention in 
the Gulf War and increasing numbers of U.S. troops in Arab lands as a declaration of war 
against Islam. However, it is important to note here that the IS ideology represents a 
significant departure from al Qaeda. IS has prioritized its enemy, or in other words where 
its grievances reside, as 1) Shia Muslims, 2) Sunni non-believers and apostate or what IS 
considers to be puppet Arab regimes, and 3) America and the West.53  
IS ideology is deeply rooted in Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict to mobilize Sunnis and 
mold its narrative of being the true protector of Sunni Muslims worldwide. IS’s use of 
frame articulation and elaboration of the near enemy concept not only rationalizes violence 
against fellow Muslims, which is in direct conflict of the Koran, it justifies its actions and 
strengthens its in-group identity.54  While IS has recently chosen to direct sufficient energy 
and resources at the United States and its western allies, the root of IS’s out-group framing 
remains with its adversaries and competitors in the Muslim world.  
4. Resources 
While external support can provide resistance movements and insurgencies with 
the resources (food, funding, weapons, and equipment) it requires to operate, this support 
may be limited by environmental factors and the nature of working in a denied area.55  The 
population of a target country can provide these groups with some or all of the necessary 
resources to maintain themselves overtime. Overbearing resource extraction from the 
 
51 Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, 6, 42, 56. 
52 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Places,” Al Quds Al Arabi, August 1996, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-
against-the-Americans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf. 
53 Gerges, ISIS. 
54 Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 130–32. 
55 “Denied areas are typically characterized by a politically sensitive and physically challenging 
environment.” Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3–05.1, Change 1 
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015), 4–4.  
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population can be contentious and may even push support away from resistance and 
insurgent groups; however, moderate resource support from the population is an effective 
means of sustainment. 
Resistance movements and insurgencies cannot effectively operate without the 
assistance from the civilian population.56 The people provide these elements with tangible 
resources (personnel, weapons, and money) and intangible resources (organizational skills, 
the ability to develop propaganda, and media products).57 Mao’s characterization of the 
importance in the relationship between the insurgent and the people explains that the people 
are the guerillas’ lifeline. In his work On Guerilla warfare, Mao writes:   
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the 
enemy’s rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the 
relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former 
may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be 
said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who 
make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native 
element cannot live.58 
al Qaeda strategist Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi also recognizes the importance of a 
supportive population and draws on the works of various military scholars to develop his 
doctrine of guerilla warfare. In his work, al-Qurashi cites German-American military 
historian Peter Paret, who explains that “in relation to the revolution, military force plays 
a secondary role; the definitive factor is the support of the people which at the same time 
 
56 Resistance: "Characterized as an objective of an insurgency. Resistance can be passive or 
aggressive; clandestine, covert, or overt; and conducted in remote, semiautonomous, or socio-politically 
distinct areas within a country. A resistance objective allows growth and maturing of the insurgency in 
numbers and capabilities, while pressuring the local and national governments." (p.II-11) Insurgents: 
"Members of an Insurgency or the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 
political control of a region. An insurgency is a form of intrastate conflict". (p.I-1) "Guerillas are one 
element of the insurgent military wing. They are paramilitary forces who conduct limited attacks, raids, and 
ambushes." (p.II-24) Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency.  
57 Gordon McCormick, “McCormick’s Mystic Diamond” (Lecture on Irregular Warfare, 2018); 
Gemma Edwards, Social Movements and Protest, Key Topics in Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2014), 44. 
58 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B Griffith, 2013, 93, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1152764. 
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forms the primary role and decisive means.” 59 As Ryan highlights, al-Qurashi habitually 
used established military theory as his own however, the point al-Qurashi acknowledged 
here is that for al Qaeda to succeed in its global jihad, it must survive, and securing support 
of the people is the key to its survival.60 
Obtaining resources is not limited to extraction from the population. Controlling 
terrain, particularly terrain that can be monetized such as arable lands for farming, lines of 
communication for taxation of transportation, and extraction of natural resources are also 
examples of how revolutionary groups can survive with limited or no external support.61  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
Supportive segments of the population provide candidates that can be developed 
into key components for controlling resistance or insurgent organizations and the 
population. UW cannot be executed “in extremis” because it requires deliberate preparation 
toward building networks and relationships as well as identifying individuals with critical 
skills that will be leveraged during execution.62 Leadership in key areas, the ability to 
govern, and the capabilities provided by establishing networks for the auxiliary, 
underground, and guerilla forces are essential elements of UW.  
1. Leadership 
Effective leadership provides resistance movements and insurgencies with 
direction and focus. Leaders can also offer groups inspiration, credibility, a method of 
organization for the group, and serve as the figure head or voice of a movement. Leadership 
is not only important for imparting strategic guidance; strong leaders can steer 
 
59 See Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986); 
Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, 90. 
60 Mark Stout, “The Makers of Jihadist Strategy,” War on the Rocks, February 4, 2014, 
https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/the-makers-of-jihadist-strategy/. 
61 Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-
2016),” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 4 (August 2016): 6–20. 
62 Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” 
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organizations and adapt to the operational environment and changes in conditions on the 
ground.63    
Strong leadership within revolutionary organizations is essential for victory in an 
insurgency however, types and styles of leadership are debated. Some believe in the 
concept of a vanguard or outside organizer. Alinsky believes that an outside organizer must 
demonstrate his credibility and overcome suspicion of his intentions from the population 
he seeks to influence.64 The insurgent and outside organizer must play on the fissures and 
resentments of the population to encourage participation.65 
During the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, socialist leaders believed that before a 
revolution could take place, a large number of the proletarian workers must mobilize to 
revolt. To do so, they developed a small cadre of intellectual vanguards or intelligentsia, to 
lead the workers toward rebellion.66 The Bolsheviks engaged in a long and deliberate 
preparation campaign through the vanguards, to agitate the workers and set conditions for 
the revolution.67 The foco or focalism concept of insurgency drew inspiration from Marxist 
revolutionaries and also required a vanguard to lead and develop conditions favorable for 
success. The foco recognized the importance of popular support but mass mobilization was 
not necessary to be successful.68  
Leadership in a revolutionary organization can tie together many aspects of UW 
theory. Charismatic leaders can secure popular support by providing groups with 
credibility through experience or captivating public engagements, as was the case with 
 
63 Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3–05.1, Change 1, 2–4. 
64 Saul David Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals, Vintage Books 
ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 98. 
65 Paul J. Tompkins Jr., ed., Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 
Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 2011), 68. 
66 Richard. Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1995), 27, 
105. 
67 Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1969), 148. 
68 According to Che, in order for the foco to be successful, three preconditions were required: 1. a lack 
of governmental legitimacy,  2. presense of "tensions" (between the population and the government) that 
cannot be addressed through a political process, 3. there are no effective legal channels to change the 
situation. Moreno, “Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation,” 115, 118.  
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Fidel Castro in Cuba. In his guidance to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, Mao discussed the importance of leadership in revolutions. Most importantly, he 
highlighted that leaders should be chosen from a group of “activists” and their decisions 
and actions must always be tightly connected to the “masses.” For Mao, leaders must be 
able to unite people and be capable of taking the needs and desires of the population then 
reframing those needs and desires in line with the goals of the larger movement. Mao 
referred to this as the concept of “from the masses, to the masses.”69  
Lastly, for many years, Osama bin Laden inspired al Qaeda as its leader by 
promoting its ideology and eventually influencing its evolution into a global network of 
decentralized regional affiliates.70 Bin Laden’s credibility within jihadist groups was 
established before the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 but after, 
his notoriety and name recognition grew tremendously, thereby increasing his leadership 
power and the power of his organization. From having less than one hundred members in 
September 2001, al Qaeda has since grown to approximately 40,000 members worldwide, 
and bin Laden will be remembered forever.71  
2. Governance  
Securing victory in UW is more than a military effort. A shadow government or 
government in exile are key parts of a resistance or insurgency because they provide groups 
with governance capability and expertise.72 Planning for the transition from guerilla 
warfare to establishing or fostering local political institutions is critical in ensuring that the 
efforts during the UW campaign are not lost or ceded to a competing organization or rival. 
 
69 Mao Tse-tung, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” in Selected Works of Mao 
Tse-Tung (China, 1943), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
3/mswv3_13.htm. 
70 Counter Extremism Project, “Al-Qaeda” (Counter Extremism Project, 2019), 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda. 
71 Christian Taylor, “Al-Qaeda Is Stronger Today Than It Was on 9/11,” Public Radio International, 
July 2, 2019, https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-07-02/al-qaeda-stronger-today-it-was-911. 
72 The Shadow Government is an "irregular governmental organization that replaces and subverts the 
local government of the regime in power." The Shadow Government can conduct security, health care, 
judicial system, etc. A Government in Exile is the "legitimate authority of a nation that has been displaced 
from its country of origin." Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare.  
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Transition planning for the end of a UW campaign is perhaps the most vital part of the 
operation.73  
To understand the importance of effective governance, we must revisit the necessity 
of popular support. Revolutionary actors establish governmental systems and seek 
collaboration from the population; active collaboration from a small number of dedicated 
supporters, “passive and exclusive collaboration” from the remainder of the population, 
and attempt to prevent collaboration between civilians and adversaries.74 Public 
administration and establishing control in a war-torn state requires significant military 
resources which revolutionary organizations usually lack. To mitigate this, groups may use 
discriminant violence to establish and maintain control as new governmental institutions 
take shape.75 
Insurgents cannot secure territory and population centers without a plan or means 
to administer the space and the population.76 Contemporary jihadist doctrine recognizes 
the importance of post-conflict governance and the ability to control areas once they have 
been seized. In his strategy, al Qaeda’s Abu Mus’ab al-Suri explains the transition from 
areas under temporary control to permanent control and the eventual establishment of a 
state.77 Additionally, groups like the Islamic State have adopted the Sun Tzu idea that “It 
is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep an army intact than to 
destroy it.”78 In other words, rather than developing a new means of establishing 
administrative and physical control systems, groups can co-opt key pieces of the existing 
 
73 Phase VII: Transition phase of UW is “The overall transition to functional governance is part of an 
overall transition that includes other sectors such as security and economic development.” Department of 
Defense.  
74 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 104. 
75 Kalyvas, 111. 
76 "As the insurgency gains control over the country, the insurgent leadership becomes responsible for 
the population, resources, and territory under its control. If the insurgency fails to plan and execute post-
hostility activities, the population may lose confidence in the insurgency and turn to the old government, a 
breakaway faction, or a splinter group of the insurgency." Department of the Army, Army Techniques 
Publication No. 3–05.1, Change 1, 2–7.  
77 Al-Suri outlines three-phases of Guerilla warfare doctrine; Stage of exhaustion, Stage of balance (or 
equilibrium), and Stage of decision or liberation. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, 230.  
78 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, n.d., 66. 
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structures to prevent large lapses in essential services and security. IS continues to use their 
military and post conflict success in Mosul during their Iraq campaign in 2014 as a 
blueprint for future operations. In a May 2019 editorial published in the Islamic State 
periodical al Naba, the author writes of “repeating the lesson of the conquest of Mosul over 
and over again and applying that blessed experiment in every land.”79 In Mosul, IS 
successfully executed a guerilla warfare strategy and rapidly transitioned existing 
government and municipal infrastructure to maintain control of the city.  
3. Guerilla, Auxiliary, and Underground Networks 
The three core operational components of an insurgency are the guerillas, auxiliary, 
and the underground. Each element is made up of indigenous irregular personnel who 
provide direct or indirect and passive or active support to guerilla warfare, subversion, 
sabotage, psychological, and information operations as part of the overall coordinated 
insurgency. Guerillas conduct overt military operations and typically achieve victory over 
conventional military forces by using speed and surprise. The auxiliary is comprised of 
members of the population who provide logistical support, information collection, and 
other activities that fit within their daily patterns of life or routines. The underground is a 
secretive and compartmentalized organization in a resistance or insurgency that is capable 
of political maneuvering and special operations in areas where the guerillas are unable to 
go.80 
From Mao to Che and al Qaeda to IS, these three components are apparent and 
consistent. While the structure of the components and tactics used vary across these groups 
and theorists, each articulates the necessity of armed military wing, a political apparatus, 
and local bases of support. Guerilla forces, because they execute higher profile military 
operations, are the most visible and identifiable part of insurgencies. Guerillas are typically 
patient adversaries that use hit-and-run tactics focusing on enemy weak points and avoid 
 
79 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State’s Portrait of Its Current Strategy,” Aymenn Jawad 
Al-Tamimi (blog), May 15, 2019, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/05/the-islamic-state-portrait-of-its-
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80 Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3–05.1, Change 1, 2–16–20. 
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enemy strengths to mitigate their disadvantages in technology, size, and capability.81 
According to Che, “at the outset, the essential task of the guerilla fighter is to keep himself 
from being destroyed.”82 
Underground and auxiliary elements are also made up of indigenous forces who 
not only provide logistical and operational support, but, also offer revolutionary 
movements a political front. In his study of insurgency case studies from the Vietcong to 
IS, Jones writes that “in insurgent warfare, strategy includes more than just military means, 
but political and other instruments as well. The political dimension of any campaign is 
critical to strategy.”83 In UW, a viable political front is critical for mobilizing the 
population, recruiting local leaders, and developing clear and consistent narratives with 
which to engage in subversion and propaganda.84 Mao may be most famously known for 
his writings on guerilla warfare; however, for Mao conducting military operations was a 
means to an end in which his communist movement could eventually be in a position to 
maximize political opportunities and seize power.85  
However, there is substantial variation from Mao to modern day revolutionaries, 
particularly Islamic jihadist groups. Mao’s concept of insurgency was built on indigenous 
Chinese revolutionaries who were native to China. This was a critical aspect of Mao’s 
theory for two reasons: 1) a large driver of Mao’s revolution was to eliminate foreign and 
imperial influence in China and 2) Mao framed his revolution as the people’s revolution, 
which must be rooted in the local Chinese population. As jihadist organizations, like al 
Qaeda, have expanded into a global network of franchises, they have relied on international 
recruitment to fill their ranks, particularly the local guerilla elements. To a large extent this 
again is a framing issue in which groups like al Qaeda and IS have created narratives of a 
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Muslim in-group writ large for whom it is the duty of all Muslims to engage in jihad to 
protect the religion against sectarian and foreign enemies. This narrative framing has been 
successful in drawing foreign recruits to these organization but, more importantly, 
galvanizing local fighters in the areas where these groups now operate.  
D. OPPORTUNITIES  
Resistance movement and insurgencies are products of environmental and 
structural influences. Insurgencies can establish themselves in either rural and/or urban 
areas; however, each of these environments presents advantages and challenges. 
Demographics such as ethnic, religious, and social groups are also considerations for 
insurgent strategies. For insurgents to be successful, the target government must be 
vulnerable to the effect of insurgent operations and proper timing from individual 
operations to the design of the overall campaign greatly influence insurgent planning.  
1. Environmental 
Resistance movements and insurgencies need advantageous environmental and 
geographic conditions that provide these groups with suitable safe haven and favorable 
terrain in which to operate. Resistance movements and insurgencies require physical 
locations for bases of operation and logistics. Typically, mountainous or periphery areas 
that are ungoverned or outside the reach of the governmental security apparatus are the 
most desirable locations, but insurgencies can also take root within urban areas where 
groups enjoy support of the local population and are able to use dense urban terrain or 
ghettos, where government forces cannot or will not access, as basing locations.86 
The hallmark of guerilla warfare is its lack of front lines, because “the front is all 
around, and the rear is nowhere.”87 Boundaries do not exist in irregular warfare because 
“irregular warfare fragments space.”88 Central to guerilla warfare is the idea of not allowing 
the enemy to fight on its own terms. The guerilla fights at the place and time of its choosing. 
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After initial defeat by U.S. forces, al Qaeda and the Taliban reassessed their guerilla 
warfare strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
In the face of early American successes, the author [al-Qurashi] turns to Sun 
Tzu’s lesson that an army must never allow the enemy to fight on its own 
terms and presents the case that America did not win the initial battles; 
rather, al-Qaeda and the Taliban declined to fight on American terms. So, 
when the Americans planned to use airpower to destroy al-Qaeda and its 
allies in Afghan cities, the jihadists withdrew into the countryside, and when 
the Americans with superior numbers sought to engage them in the 
countryside, they refused to engage and withdrew into the mountains to 
prolong the war and wait for the best time and place to counterattack.89 
2. Political 
All warfare is inherently political.90 In UW, structural considerations can contribute 
to the creation of a revolution and play a major role in the success of an UW campaign. 
Ideally, the target government or regime must be weak and ineffective in order for the 
resistance movement or insurgency to expand its capabilities and challenge the 
government. A government able to control infrastructure and the population with an 
effective intelligence and security organizations is a difficult target. A weak government 
can also be attributed to the status of its political relationships. Some theorists believe that 
the political relationships between key groups such as the state and elites, peasants and 
landlords, groups in conflict over resources, and states competing in the international 
system drives revolution more so than economic factors.91  In this regard, it can be argued 
that “revolutions are not made, they come” as a result of competition and relationships 
between these groups.92  
In Cuba, Castro and Che’s foco relied on the strength of its military wing and the 
failures of the weakened and relatively unsupported Batista government in order to be 
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successful.93 In contrast, while the rise of jihadist groups in the Middle East may be 
considered an “organic crisis of the Arab state,” they would not have grown without 
significant support from restless, marginalized, and susceptible populations.94 The U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, de-Baathification, disbanding the Iraqi military, and a post-
invasion Shia Muslim dominated government with failing political institutions all 
contributed to the rise of al Qaeda in Iraq and eventually IS. Additionally, many leaders of 
jihadist groups spent time in U.S.-run Iraqi prisons such as Camp Bucca, which allowed 
them to network and created bastions for radicalization and the development of jihadist 
insurgent theory. Between 2008–2010, in the leadup to the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, U.S. 
forces released over 20,000 prisoners. This provided IS with an immediate indigenous 
recruiting pool, many of whom had been radicalized.95 
3. Timing 
Most resistance and insurgent groups go through several phases of development 
and organization. The Mao construct of popular protracted warfare is commonly used to 
articulate this concept; however, because revolutionary groups are so varied, it is difficult 
to put all of them into one model or framework. Timing remains a constant imperative for 
these groups because action against the target government too soon or too late could 
ultimately lead to failure. Understanding the conditions within the government, population, 
environment, and the revolutionary organization are keys to success.96  
The purpose of a guerilla warfare strategy is to impose costs on an adversary using 
force but avoid decisive, sustained engagement.97 Mao and Sun Tzu agree on the 
requirements for successful execution of a guerilla warfare strategy such as the need for 
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speed and careful selection and planning for targets on the adversary’s exterior lines, to 
avoid decisive engagement with an overwhelming enemy force, and at a time when the 
enemy is unprepared to respond.98 
4. Demographics 
Demographics certainly fit within environmental factors and may play a role in the 
development of ideology, particularly in-group identity construction and grievances; 
however, for the purposes of this research, it is worth highlighting demographics as a stand-
alone unit of analysis because of the way in which revolutionary groups can co-opt or 
coerce urban and rural religious and ethnic and nationalist and socio-economic groups to 
garner support for their activities.  
It is clear that popular support is key; however, a critical aspect to successful 
movements has been the way in which they began. Mao and Lenin’s efforts were 
indigenous in nature. Che, a native Argentinian, was successful in Cuba but only under the 
overall leadership of a charismatic Cuban, Fidel Castro. Che’s attempts to export 
Communism through Cuban-sponsored unconventional warfare in Congo and Bolivia 
failed.99 These failures were in large part a result of Che’s disregard for the political, social, 
and cultural nuances of those countries.100 Like Che, IS’s initial efforts in Iraq proved to 
be difficult. Challenges in marketing their religious ideology and the “foreign roots of the 
organization” allowed established Iraqi Sunni tribes to rally against the early IS movement 
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during the Sahwa.101 When IS changed its leadership in 2007 to known Iraqi jihadists, it 
refocused IS and provided local authenticity and legitimacy.102  
Successful UW requires favorable conditions, forward thinking, commitment, and 
the right opportunities. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the four critical pillars of 
UW. The analysis of the following case studies will demonstrate how IS’s execution of 
UW by providing external support to each group directly influenced the groups’ ability to; 
leverage the population, develop organizational control functions, and seize opportunities.  
 
Figure 1. Interconnection of the requisite conditions for successful 
unconventional warfare  
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III. CASE STUDY: JABHAT AL NUSRA 
A. OVERVIEW  
In 2010, IS was seeing success in its initiatives to mitigate the Sahwa (Sunni 
Awakening) and began redeveloping support of the Sunni Muslim communities in western 
and northern Iraq.103 At the end of 2011, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be complete 
and IS operations would begin to ramp up.104 The absence of the U.S. and the inability of 
Iraqi forces to fill the void in targeting the IS movement, fostered the expansion of a local 
Sunni support base in Iraq provided the group with room to expand its operations beyond 
the country it operated in for close to a decade.  
In neighboring Syria, a civil war was raging which gave way to the rise of dozens 
of rebel groups and a blurred line between those waging war in a revolution against the 
Assad government and opportunistic jihadists capitalizing on the turmoil in Syria. Amid 
the chaos and volatility of the war, IS saw an opportunity to expand. This would become 
IS’s first UW operation to expand its influence outside of Iraq. Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi(Baghdadi) dispatched a trusted lieutenant and native Syrian, Abu Mohammed 
al-Jolani (Jolani), with a small contingent of IS personnel from Iraq in August 2011 to 
connect with well-developed IS networks in Syria, which IS used to support its insurgency 
in Iraq, and created the IS branch in Syria.105   
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To some, Jolani’s work in Syria from August to October 2011, would be seen as 
unifying the many smaller and ideologically similar militant groups on the battlefield. 
Jolani pledged to connect and support rebel groups that had been oppressed and brutalized 
by the Syrian government. This led to the name Jabhat al Nusra (JN) which translated 
means “Support Front.”106 JN couched its position as nationalist in support of the fight 
against the Assad government through the use of jihad to achieve its ends.107 JN employed 
a “Syria First” doctrine and embedded in towns and cities fighting alongside opposition 
groups with various ideologies.108 As Charles Lister puts it,  
Jabhat al Nusra therefore sought to present itself as a hyper-localized 
jihadist organization that would implement a patient and long-term strategy 
focused on integrating into local dynamics and in shaping alliances, 
avoiding enemies, and abstaining from overly swift or extreme 
implementation of Sharia.109 
JN formally announced its establishment in Syria on January 23, 2012.110 In a video 
recording, Jolani declared war against the Assad government and Iran, entering a complex 
Syrian Civil War battlefield.111 During 2012, JN would launch a wave of attacks against 
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Syrian government targets In less than one year, the United Stated labeled JN a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization for its connections to al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).112  
JN has since broken away from the Islamic State and al Qaeda, rebranded itself as 
a nationalist revolutionary group, changed its name to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and 
is considered to be one of the most powerful and successful militant organizations in Syria. 
JN is commonly written about as a unique Syrian Group without mention of its root within 
IS; however, the origins of JN and its creation and sponsorship was IS’s first use of UW to 
expand its influence.113  
B. THE POPULATION 
1. Legitimacy 
IS learned many lessons from its hardships in Iraq. The Sahwa movement took its 
toll on IS, and, as a result, IS realized that securing the support of a large portion of the 
population would be essential for future success. JN conducted over 600 attacks against 
Syrian government targets between November 2011 to December 2012, and in doing so, 
labeled itself as the protector of Syrian Sunni Muslims from the Syrian government.114 The 
perception of Sunni protector and nationalist revolutionary group is significant for several 
reasons: 1) it allowed JN to maximize backing from a broad coalition of armed opposition 
groups all fighting against the Syrian government which helped JN spread its influence 
across the country, 2) it allowed JN to leverage popular support from the Syrian people in 
the areas where it operated which was critical for survival, 3) it began to lay the 
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groundwork for the sectarian narrative it would soon adopt, and 4) it assisted JN in brand 
management by “masking its jihadist identity” and links to ISI.115   
Over the course of the campaign, JN accumulated several significant victories 
against Syrian military forces, particularly in major population centers that the Syrian 
government identified as important for maintaining political control. These victories 
yielded significant positive and negative effects. Between September 2012–March 2013, 
JN and its network of alliances took control of territory in notable cities, towns, and border 
crossings across northern Syria, thereby increasing their legitimacy at the expense of the 
government.116 Second, JN now had access to a substantial civilian population and 
additional material resources which it would leverage to spread its jihadist ideology and 
eventually establish civil administration. While the attacks were successful, their level of 
violence, civilian collateral damage, and the use of suicide bombers gave rise to some 
concern among civilians.117 
Ostensibly, JN was gaining some trust and support of the population; however, it is 
likely that JN coerced some of that support.118 JN was capable of conducting state-like 
activities in areas where the Syrian government was unable or unwilling to control, and 
demonstrated competence and success in military operations, eliminated or partnered with 
potential competitors, and administered a legal system and taxation policies.119   
2. Ideology 
In a British Broadcasting Corporation interview with Abu Lokman, the JN Emir of 
Aleppo, he described JN by saying “we are Syrian mujahedeen, back from various jihad 
fronts to restore God’s rule on the Earth and avenge the Syrians’ violated honor and spilled 
blood.” In this interview, Abu Lokman used JN’s depth of experience on other battlefields 
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and the organization’s commitment to Islam to highlight its strengths and reasons for its 
success. JN’s identity as a local jihadist group was critical to gain influence with the local 
population and for build relationships with other organizations. Despite this carefully 
constructed narrative, JN was a transnational Salafi jihadist group that came into Syria and 
recruited local fighters, adopted a hyper-local narrative to counter accusations that it was 
influenced by the global jihad movement and therefore much larger than local 
communities.120 To this point, Gerges emphasizes that Jolani was cautious to reveal JN’s 
connection to IS because many Syrians considered IS far too extreme to mesh with 
mainstream Syrian norms.121 A leader within JN confirmed Jolani’s intention to mask the 
link to IS by saying, “this [initially hiding JN’s ties to IS] was a plan from Jolani himself. 
We would show our values, deal with people well, and then after a while we’d tell them, 
‘The al Qaeda that was smeared in the media? This is it. We are it. What do you think of 
us…?”122  
3. Grievances 
JN’s most consistent grievance is that Muslims in Syria (and elsewhere) have 
strayed from the true path of Islam and that the Assad government is to blame for 
marginalizing and repressing Syrian Sunnis.123 JN’s goal remained to oust Assad from 
power and install an Islamist government based on the Koran and sharia law.124 The 
removal of Assad was a common goal, shared by many of the revolutionary actors and 
civilian supporters within Syria; and, IS wanted Assad deposed because of his 
administration’s secular and non-Sunni roots. JN effectively used the rifts within Syrian 
society by “hijacking” existing civilian grievances to secure its foothold among Syrian 
 
120 “Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)” (Counter Extremism Project, September 2019), 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/nusra-front-jabhat-fateh-al-sham. 
121 Gerges, ISIS, 182–83. 
122 Kyle Orton, “The Riddle of Haji Bakr,” Kyle Orton’s Blog (blog), November 10, 2015, 
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/11/10/the-riddle-of-haji-bakr/. 
123 Balint Szlanko, “Jabhat Al Nusra’s New Syria,” The National, December 15, 2012, sec. MENA, 
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/jabhat-al-nusra-s-new-syria-1.364239. 
124 Lister, “Profiling Jabhat Al-Nusra,” 10. 
34 
Muslims.125 The Syrian military’s violent and heavy-handed actions to suppress protests 
stemming from the Arab Spring provided JN with justification to target government forces 
and facilitated their nationalist narratives.126  
In 2012 it became clear that there was Iranian influence in the Syrian conflict 
because of the Quds Force military advisors and materiel support to the Syrian military.127 
JN’s nationalist position sought to not only protect Syrian Sunni Muslims from the Assad 
government but also from foreign intervention, which resulted in JN adding Iran to its list 
of enemies. Iran’s role in the war intensified the sectarian nature of the conflict, which 
would become increasingly adopt the tones of the regional Sunni versus Shia contest for 
influence.  
4. Resources 
JN received startup support from Baghdadi, the emir of ISI, and worked to leverage 
al Qaeda’s financial networks in Syria and the greater Middle East as sources of funding; 
however, JN quickly needed to establish a robust means of sustaining the organization and 
operations.128 JN increasingly sought to control populations centers for their strategic 
utility in providing the group with legitimacy but, more importantly, access to resources 
and the people. While the majority of the Syrian civilian population is located along the 
Mediterranean coast, a sizeable population lives in the cities and towns along the Euphrates 
River.129  
To take control of these resource-rich areas, JN once again partnered with tribes 
and other opposition groups to seize assets in key locations along the Euphrates River. In 
addition to being militarily significant, these partnerships also offered JN access to 
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additional funding streams from the Gulf nations who supported these groups.130 Once 
under control, JN would use extractive means such as taxes, tariffs, ransoms, and asset 
seizures to secure financial and materiel support.131 Additionally, Syria’s eastern region 
contains the majority of Syria’s oil and natural gas resources, which provided JN with a 
major source of revenue to fund its ongoing operations.132 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
1. Leadership 
Choosing Jolani to lead the IS branch in Syria was significant for several reasons 
and illustrated the importance of the undertaking to Baghdadi. First, Jolani was experienced 
and fought alongside Zarqawi in the early days of AQI. His reputation as an accomplished 
jihadist and capable leader would be critical for this task. Second, Jolani was a trusted 
leader in Iraq in 2011 and the emir of Ninawa Province, a strategic piece of IS territory 
critical for logistics and funding.133 Lastly and perhaps most important, Jolani was Syrian, 
which would provide indigenous legitimacy to the operation. IS understood that foreign 
leadership can be seen as polarizing and dissuade local supporters.134 This was particularly 
critical in Syria as many saw the conflict becoming a proxy war between “Turkey, Qatar, 
and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah on the other.”135  
2. Governance  
Jolani also recognized that effective governmental systems must be ready to 
function immediately after JN secured territory. To that end, JN opened al Dawa (call to 
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religion) offices to begin religious indoctrination, worked with other militant groups to 
establish religious courts for settling disputes and prosecuting criminals in the towns and 
cities it controlled, ensured essential services such as water and electricity, and most 
importantly, protected the people through security. IS also planned to create institutions for 
“schools, daycare, the media, and transportation.”136 To maximize its influence, JN made 
skillful use of a media outlet called al-Manara al-Bayda (the White Minaret). JN used the 
media to publicize charitable acts such as the Qism al-Ighatha (relief department), which 
provided resources to the poorest of the population.137 JN’s success on the battlefield and 
in governance immediately provided them with credibility and made them appear to be a 
legitimate alternative to the Syrian government. In his analysis of JN, Gerges writes “the 
strategy of al-Nusra and then ISIS has consistently been one of ‘first build and then later 
leverage influence,’ establishing state-like institutions, providing essential services, and 
delivering order.”138  
3. Guerilla, Auxiliary, and Underground Networks 
Once in Syria, Jolani and his advance party would recruit and establish dozens of 
small cells, taking over smaller established rebel groups.139 During this time, Jolani 
received financial support and guidance from Baghdadi in Iraq. Baghdadi’s overarching 
goal was to support Jolani in order to consolidate control over as much territory as 
possible.140  
Once militarily in control of terrain, JN deliberately worked to implement durable 
solutions for effective management of their territory within Syria. JN developed tactics to 
coerce opponents and eliminate threats, capitalize on internal fissures within the 
population, and put devoted supporters in key positions within the newly established 
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government and civil administration infrastructure.141 The JN plan for consolidation and 
expansion began during its strategy development. Samir Abd Muhammed al-Khilfawi, 
commonly known as Haji Bakr, a notorious IS strongman and leader, as well as a former 
Iraqi Air Defense intelligence officer under Sadham Hussein, traveled to Syria in 2012 to 
assist JN with establishing the IS branch in Syria. Using the blueprint from the ISI 
organization, Haji Bakr supervised an in-depth Preparation of the Environment (PE) 
operation in the areas deemed most critical to IS.142 Haji Bakr oversaw the recruitment of 
informants and spies to infiltrate local villages and collect information on powerful 
families, political and military leaders, and illegal activities.143 Haji Bakr’s spies also 
provided IS leadership with information on divisions within the population and 
atmospherics from civilians that IS could leverage as it established governmental systems. 
The information gathered “could be used to divide and subjugate the local population.”144 
JN orchestrated a campaign of assassinations, kidnapping, and blackmail to set conditions 
favorable to IS occupation.  
JN continued to grow its network of cells and developed formal alliances with 
adjacent opposition groups from Deir ez Zour, Aleppo, and Damascus. IS was focused 
particularly on JN infiltrating the rural areas surrounding cities and towns in northern Syria, 
which would provide it with the support base IS would need to control the urban centers.145  
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D. OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Environmental  
Within the chaos of war-torn Syria, JN and IS found opportunity. The civil war 
provided JN with a natural safe haven among the dozens of opposition and jihadist groups 
in the country. The government’s inability to control the northern and eastern portions of 
Syria provided JN the opportunity to expand in those locations. Additionally, the already-
developed logistic and operational networks ISI used during their insurgency in Iraq 
created a natural base of operations. Lastly, JN could also leverage the porous border 
between Syria and Iraq to reach back to ISI and facilitate the movement of personnel, 
weapons, and supplies.146  
2. Political 
IS’s decision to move forward with establishing JN was driven by significant 
political opportunities within Syria. In 2011, the Arab Spring was sweeping across North 
Africa and the Middle East, which presented pro-democracy advocates in Syria with the 
opportunity to initiate public demonstrations criticizing the Bashar al Assad government. 
The Syrian government’s violent response to protests and attempts to maintain order within 
the country, along with disparate economic and social conditions within Syria, drove the 
country into civil war.147 In an effort to maintain control and quell the rebellion, the Syrian 
government was forced to focus military resources in the country’s major population 
centers throughout western Syria, leaving a power vacuum in the northern and eastern 
regions along the Euphrates River. As the civil war spread across Syria, opposition groups 
and Islamic organizations began establishing themselves and searching for a place within 
the conflict. In July 2011, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began loosely organizing, but a lack 
of funding, equipment, and experienced fighters led to early hardships for the group. At 
this time JN was still small but growing in strength behind the credibility of its members 
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through their combat experience during the war in Iraq, and its sources of external support 
from ISI.  
In December 2011, JN initiated its guerilla warfare strategy by conducting its first 
claimed attack in Damascus using two suicide bombers against a Syrian Army Intelligence 
building. In early 2012, JN conducted two more attacks against Syrian government targets 
in Damascus and Aleppo.148 The results of JN’s early attacks were mixed; however, their 
effectiveness and messaging provided JN with credibility among other jihadists who now 
saw JN as being one of the more organized groups on the battlefield. This organizational 
capacity combined with JN’s military prowess would prove to be their greatest asset and 
most significant recruiting tool. 
3. Timing 
IS’s timing of their expansion to Syria opportunistically coincided with the Arab 
Spring and the onset of the Syrian Civil War. Within a few years of expansion IS initiatives 
and JN’s operations were successful. By 2013, JN was seen as one the most, if not the 
most, powerful armed groups in Syria.149 JN transitioned to direct operations against the 
Syrian government and from February to March 2013, JN and its allies achieved strategic 
victories in Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa, and Hasakah while maintaining operations in Hama 
Province using professional military tactics, combined arms maneuver, and fire support.150 
Additionally, JN controlled several key border crossing points from Syria to Turkey, which 
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would allow JN to receive logistical support and foreign fighters. JN had an active presence 
in eleven of Syria’s thirteen provinces.151 
4. Demographics 
JN was clearly a Sunni organization that leveraged the Sunni Muslim majority in 
Syria and developed narratives consistent with local grievances and promoted stability 
within the Sunni community to secure support. The Syrian Civil War devolved into a 
sectarian conflict which pitted Sunni Muslims against Shia Muslims and Bashar al Assad’s 
Alawite sect, further driving supporters toward groups like JN for protection.   
E. ANALYSIS 
IS’s sponsorship of JN was its first UW operation to expand its influence outside 
of Iraq. Syria was a natural choice for IS expansion for several reasons. First, proximity to 
Iraq and access through the porous border facilitated the IS expansion. IS also had deep 
ties to logistic and operational networks within the country networks established during the 
U.S. occupation of Iraq made Syrian resource pools available to the group. Second, the 
under-governed free spaces in eastern Syria provided IS with a safe haven and the 
opportunity to exploit the lack of Syrian government presence in the area. Third, the Syrian 
Revolution created a susceptible and unsecure civilian Sunni population with sufficient 
grievances that IS would co-opt. IS recognized that skillfully framing their narratives and 
shaping their ideological in-group messaging would allow them to bring together dozens 
of disorganized militant groups already seeking direction. This provided IS with increased 
military capability, mobilized additional resources, and gave the group grassroots 
legitimacy.  
IS chose a capable leader in Jolani to lead its expansion. Jolani was capable in two 
major ways: 1) he was a native Syrian which made the JN ideology and narratives appear 
to be organically Syrian, 2) he possessed intangible leadership resources which he used to 
successfully develop a robust organization. Jolani's leadership had a major impact on how 
IS approached future UW campaigns. As we will see in later case studies, IS learned that 
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it must take a more active role in controlling the leadership of its franchises, in order to 
avoid ideological and operational splits, like what occurred with JN.  
IS was able to capitalize on the effort and resources spent in Syria. IS still controlled 
a large portion or northeastern Syria for four years, maintained a capital city in Raqqah, 
and extracted significant resources from the Syrian population under its control. While it 
has rebranded the organization and cut overt ties to al Qaeda, JN (now HTS) remains a 
highly effective jihadist group in Syria. Its military competence and success on the 
battlefield, professionalism of the organization, and implementation of effective public 
administration distinguished JN from its competitors.  
The experience with JN provided IS with several lessons learned. First, the 
insurgency doctrine that IS developed in Iraq was validated and improved by its 
effectiveness in Syria. The model of establishing intelligence and support networks, 
infiltrating groups, isolating population centers by controlling the surrounding countryside, 
then taking over the city through siege-like tactics and attritional warfare worked and is 
still the bedrock of IS doctrine today.152 Additionally, the use of religious education centers 
to indoctrinate civilians, special police to maintain control over the population, and 
governance were all effective practices.153  Second, while IS was proficient at insurgency 
and guerilla warfare from its time spent fighting in Iraq, managing the insurgency from 
afar proved to be a difficult undertaking. JN shifted from the IS ideological and operational 
goals of establishing an Islamic caliphate to becoming a nationalist organization. This 
change in ideology and narrative framing allowed JN to mobilize Syrian resources, increase 
its popular support base, and gain credibility.  
A detailed discussion of the split between JN and IS exceeds the scope of this 
research; however, there are some salient points to highlight that also show the level of IS 
senior leadership involved in this expansion. First, IS lost organizational capability once 
JN split as some of the most competent and experienced Syrian members left with Jolani. 
Second, IS saw how effective JN’s model was and likely adjusted its own model of 
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expansion to reflect those lessons learned. Third, as JN became more popular and 
successful, Baghdadi began to realize that JN was growing outside of ISI’s ability to control 
and recognized the need to develop a contingency plan in order to maintain the group’s 
foothold in Syria. Baghdadi sent Haji Bakr and his team of spies to observe Jolani and JN’s 
activities in an attempt to steer the group back into the ISI fold. When that failed, Baghdadi 
himself traveled to Syria and tried to change Jolani’s ways; but, this too was unsuccessful. 
In the end, JN rejected ISI and Baghdadi, and pledged allegiance to al Qaeda. In response, 
Baghdadi executed his contingency plan which resulted in groups throughout Homs and 
Aleppo, once loyal to JN, defecting to IS and gave the group control of key areas it would 
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IV. CASE STUDY:  
ISLAMIC STATE—KHORASAN PROVINCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
IS did what few thought was possible, it established a caliphate and was in control 
of a significant amount of terrain, infrastructure, and civilian population centers in Iraq and 
Syria, for several years. As a result the world shifted its focus in shock and IS shifted its 
sights toward central Asia in a deliberate attempt to expand into what IS leadership 
considered “a favorable environment.”155 Whispers of IS operating in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (AF/PAK) began in 2014, but, to a great extent, were written off as false or merely 
an example of the band wagon effect of smaller insurgent groups in Afghanistan seeking 
to ride the coat tails of IS. It was not until two years later that Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan publicly acknowledged that Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) had 
“financial, strategic, and communications connections” to the Islamic State.156  
Leaders within the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban had sent over 1,000 fighters from 
their organizations to Syria.157 The success of IS on the battlefield, its financial solvency, 
and dedication to its Salafist ideology became more and more attractive to Afghan and 
Pakistani fighters who feared their organizations would eventually agree to peace treaties 
with their governments.158 IS began recruiting and mobilizing networks in central Asia, 
which resulted in several militant groups and defectors from the Afghan and Pakistani 
Taliban to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi and form the group that would become IS-K. In 
January 2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani officially announced the creation 
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of IS-K.159 Initially, IS-K and the Taliban had a non-hostile relationship; however, that 
changed, and IS-K added the Taliban to its list of enemies in the region. 
In the summer of 2015, IS-K would see initial success in Nangarhar and southern 
Helmand Province.160 These victories appeared to be similar to the large advances IS had 
become famous for in Iraq and Syria. By the middle of 2016, Iranian, Afghan, and Pakistani 
intelligence reports indicated that IS-K was active in one-third of Afghanistan’s thirty-four 
provinces.161 Following its early success, IS-K experienced operational setbacks as a result 
of a high rate of leadership turnover resulting from the successful barrage of counterattacks 
by local militias, Coalition air strikes, and Taliban forces.162 However, IS-K remains a 
threat in Afghanistan with approximately 2,500-3,000 fighters in the country. In a February 
2019 interview with General Joseph Votel, the former U.S. Central Command Commander, 
he stated that “[IS-K] represent a very sophisticated and dangerous threat that we have to 
stay focused on.”163 According to the current Afghanistan Ambassador to the United 
States, the IS-K threat has not yet eclipsed the Taliban but it is growing.164  
B. THE POPULATION 
1. Legitimacy 
The creation of IS-K would be a major undertaking for IS-Central in an area of the 
world much different from where it was comfortable operating.165 Even before news of the 
Islamic State’s successes in Iraq and Syria reached an international audience, IS-Central 
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was already pursing and attracting recruits from Pakistan and Afghanistan.166 The AF/PAK 
revolutionary landscape was already crowded with established jihadist groups, many of 
whom were supported by external actors with varied ideological and state interests. To gain 
legitimacy in the region, IS-K sought to promote the IS-Central narrative of being the 
preeminent and most professional salafi jihadist organization in the world and the sole 
protector of Sunni Muslims.167 Through propaganda and messaging across various 
mediums and published in the languages organic to the region, IS-K called for all jihadist 
groups in Khorasan to join the Islamic State, highlighting the theological necessity to 
establish an Islamic caliphate.168   
To solidify its legitimacy, IS-K referenced fatwas issued by Ibn Taymiyya in the 
13th century, who urged Muslims to fight back against the Mongols attacking Muslim 
areas.169 IS-K used historical precedent to justify its violence against Muslims and other 
ethnic groups. Additionally, IS-K framed its presence in AF/PAK as carrying on the jihad 
against foreign influences in the region, likening itself to Afghan historical heroes: the 
Afghan mujahedeen who fought against the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United 
States.170 This was part of IS-K's efforts to frame the Taliban as a nationalist, rather than 
Islamic group, and a puppet organization controlled by Pakistan. 
2. Ideology 
Ideologically, IS-K does not differ significantly from its parent organization, 
although, as we will discuss later, IS-K’s alleged financial sponsorship by some Arab gulf 
states influenced changes in the way it behaves.171 IS-Central sponsorship of IS-K fits its 
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self-proclaimed global role and extending into AF/PAK lends credence to the IS claim of 
establishing a global caliphate.172 IS presence on the western and eastern borders of Iran 
signals resolve and capability to its Iranian enemies. Expansion also serves as a primary 
means of distinguishing the Islamic State from its primary competitors in the region, the 
Taliban and al Qaeda. IS consistently frames the Taliban as narrowly focused on 
Afghanistan with no aspirations to further Islam’s position in the world. Moreover, IS-K 
claims that the Taliban are a nationalist group and questions the Islamic character of the 
Taliban as an organization. IS-K also highlights that rather than rule strictly by Sharia law, 
the Taliban has diluted their rules and laws to cater to tribal customs and tradition, a 
substantial divergence from IS-K which remains staunch adherents to and proponents of 
Sharia.173 Despite the rhetoric, IS-K has shown that it is capable of being pragmatic at 
times. As we will discuss later, IS-K has been willing to temporarily relax some of its 
ideological constraints in order to gain favor and support from the population.174  
IS-K’s and IS-Central’s ideologies shaped clear in and out groups. In the case of 
IS-K, the in group remains the cooperative Sunni Muslim ummah.175 In Khorasan, there 
are three major out-groups: 1) the Afghan and Pakistani governments which IS-K believe 
to be western-backed, secular, puppet regimes, 2) Shias and other Muslim minorities, Iran 
and its proxies in the region, and 3) the Taliban, other jihadist organizations operating in 
the region, and individuals that refuse to pledge allegiance to IS.  
3. Grievances  
IS-K has effectively co-opted local grievances within AF/PAK, particularly among 
disenfranchised members of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The IS-K and, more 
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broadly, the IS-Central global jihad narrative resonates with fighters in AF/PAK that have 
witnessed their organizations struggle to achieve their stated goals with their region. As 
previously mentioned, many of these jihadists see the biggest threat to their movement and 
livelihood as a negotiated settlement with the Afghan government. IS-K is also appealing 
to more uncompromising jihadists who believe that seeking jihad globally is their duty and 
a positive evolution of the Islamic movement.176 A growing number of hardline jihadists 
within the Taliban felt that the organization was under the control of the Pakistani 
intelligence service, ISI, and, as a result, could not spread jihad to other countries in the 
region. The Taliban’s organizational nature of being more tribally aligned and driven by 
tribal disputes also discouraged some members. To some Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, 
the “Arab character” (the way that IS-K was committed to Islam and the idea of a global 
jihad) of IS-K was genuine and naturally attractive as it set the organization apart from its 
peers.177 Iran’s involvement fighting against IS-Central in Iraq and Syria and its support to 
militant groups within Afghanistan has placed it high on the list of enemies for IS-K. In 
fact, the IS-K mandate specifically emphasizes retaliation against Iranian and Russian 
interests in Khorasan.178  
4. Resources 
IS-K received external support from IS-Central, but also received financial and 
materiel resources from outside donors. In 2015, IS-K ordered all of the new groups it had 
enrolled underneath the IS-K umbrella to stop directly accepting third party funding; 
however, some evidence suggests IS-K, along with its sub-groups, received funding from 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan.179 IS-K also successfully leveraged existing mosque, 
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madrassa (school), and charity networks within the AF/PAK border regions to secure 
logistical and financial support.180  
Similar to IS-Central, in areas under its control, IS-K was capable of extracting 
significant resources from the population through the taxation of goods and materials 
consistent with Islamic law such as livestock, agricultural, precious metals, and wood.181 
Although growing and harvesting poppy, is considered illegal, IS-K’s on and off taxation 
of the drug trade represents another instance of IS-K’s opportunistic nature and pragmatism 
with respect to local culture and tradition.182  IS-K also considers Nangahar’s relatively 
open border between Afghanistan and Pakistan as critical for revenue streams from 
smuggling, human trafficking, and kidnapping.183 Lastly, IS-K sought to control terrain in 
areas rich in natural resources where it could control and monetize the mining of rare stones 
and minerals.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS. 
1. Leadership 
IS-K leadership has been predominantly Pakistani. At the time of IS-K’s inception, 
Hafiz Saeed Khan was chosen by Baghdadi to serve as the Governor of Khorasan and 
leader of the group.184 Khan was a Pakistani jihadist from Orakzai Agency in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and formerly the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP).185 Khan was killed in a U.S. drone strike in July 2016.186 Maintaining continuity of 
leadership in IS-K was a difficult task. Several of the subsequent leaders were targeted by 
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Coalition forces and killed. Additionally, rifts between the Pakistani and Afghan leaders 
within IS-K proved to become problematic in terms of the operational focus and direction 
of the group.187 It appeared that differences of opinions and beliefs between the Pakistani 
and Afghan leadership resulted in IS-K struggling to create a consistent, coordinated effort 
across both countries.188    
According to interviews of IS-K personnel conducted by Antonio Giustozzi and his 
research staff, to ensure IS-K was developing in line with the intent of IS-Central, the 
parent organization took several steps to oversee its establishment. First, IS-Central 
retained final approval for changes to laws, rules, and leadership. IS-Central authorized IS-
K to make tactical and administrative decisions about military operations, recruitment, and 
financing without seeking approval from IS-Central. Second, IS-Central appointed a 
“Special Representative” to IS-K to speak for IS-Central, serve as a liaison, and verify that 
IS guidelines and instructions were being followed. Third, IS-Central implemented an 
auditing system by conducting nearly quarterly inspections of IS-K finances and 
operations.189 Lastly, single source reporting indicated that IS-Central committed a 
significant amount of human resources to IS-K in the form of operational advisors and, in 
mid-2015, sent a large contingent of military advisers to assist with indoctrination and 
training of IS-K officers.190 
2. Governance 
IS-K has been most active in four regional pockets of Afghanistan. In the east, their 
strongest area, IS-K has been in operating in Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan provinces. 
Each of these provinces shares a border with Pakistan which, as previously noted, allows 
IS-K to leverage cross-border operational and logistical networks. In the northeast, IS-K 
has been present in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan. IS-K activity has also been seen in 
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the western provinces of Herat and Farrah and to the north in Jawzjan, Faryab, and Sar-e 
Pul.191  
While IS-K remains active in the above-mentioned areas, their control of territory 
through civil administration and bureaucratic systems has been inconsistent. Southern 
Nangarhar Province is their most successful attempt at implementation of governance in 
line with the IS-Central model. In parts of Nangarhar, IS-K built a system of taxation, 
courts, prisons, and other governmental agencies servicing security and educational 
requirements. The greatest differences between IS-K and IS-Central’s ability to implement 
governance is IS-K’s lack of organizational capacity and the nature of the terrain.192 In Iraq 
and Syria, IS-Central leveraged the intangible resources of members who had practical 
experience within government. Additionally, Iraq and Syria are relatively well-connected 
by lines of communication with larger population centers. Afghanistan, on the other hand, 
is expansive with smaller communities and villages separated by great distances and 
difficult terrain.  
IS-K has enjoyed greatest support in areas where the population leans Salafist and 
the local forces loyal to IS-K have been in control for a substantial period of time.193 
However, in areas where IS-K has found it difficult to secure willing cooperation of the 
population and tribal or village leadership, the group has consistently shown willingness to 
conduct violent attacks and use coercive policies. Kidnappings, assassinations, and 
intimidation have been effective tools for controlling the population but also in deterring 
interference from other groups.194 Generally IS-K has continued the IS-Central model of 
divide and rule using violence and sectarianism to keep constituents in line and remain 
relevant as a source of security.   
IS-K also attempted to make in-roads with tribal elders and the local mullahs 
(Islamic scholars and theologians). While reporting is mixed on the success of these 
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endeavors, IS-K had success building relationships with other Salafists in parts of 
Nangahar and Kunar Provinces. In other locations, IS-K used intimidation, coercion, and 
assassination to obtain local support.195 IS-K would also have to adapt its ideology and 
rules to fit within decades of established norms. The most apparent example of this was IS-
K’s decision to temporarily suspend the ban on opium production and drug smuggling. In 
November 2015, the IS-Central Special Representative to IS-K, Abu Yasir al-Afghani, 
implemented a strict ban on growing poppy and the taxation of the drug trade because drugs 
are prohibited by Islam.196 There were rumors that IS-K continued to allow drugs to move 
through their territory in order to collect taxes on the products but, publicly IS-K took a 
hard line on drugs. This was similar to the way in which IS-Central levied taxes on drug 
smuggling in Iraq and Syria.197 However, in 2017 the opium ban was suspended in parts 
of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. This was likely a political move to appeal to the tribal 
elders for tacit support and portray IS-K as understanding of local culture. It also provided 
IS-K access to additional tax revenue.198       
3. Guerilla, Auxiliary, and Underground Networks 
As a relatively foreign organization, IS-K had to rely on already establish networks, 
made by other jihadist organizations, for recruitment, sustainment, and information. IS-K 
would also grow its guerilla forces from the ranks of already recognized jihadist groups. 
IS-Central began laying the ground work for expansion to the region as early as 2013 by 
courting Pakistani and Afghan groups to support IS-Central in Iraq and Syria, and would 
later leverage those relationships to begin expansion in central Asia.199 IS-Central 
reportedly sent $42 million to the Haqqani Network in order to maintain a good working 
relationship and facilitate IS-K expansion. IS-K also allegedly offered leaders of the 
Pakistani elements fighting in Syria $1 million to begin recruiting once they returned 
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home.200 Once on the ground, in 2014, IS-K began forming around three main Afghan 
jihadist groups: Tehrik-e Khilafat Khorasan, Khilafat Afghan, and the Azizullah Haqqani 
Group. In Pakistan, Tehrik-e Khilafat Pakistan was the primary cohesive force for IS-K.201  
IS-K operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan show distinct variation. Giustiozzi 
explains that in Afghanistan “IS-K adopted a mixed approach: small groups spread around 
to mostly do recruitment, and a few strongholds where IS-K could build up its army.”202 
The IS-K stronghold concept consisted of IS-K establishing temporary, hidden bases 
throughout Afghanistan, occupied by small “underground” teams which would then travel 
to make contact with the Taliban as well as tribal and village elders to set conditions for 
IS-K future operations.203 Operationally, IS-K conducted guerilla warfare to secure the 
territory under its control. IS-K also used underground elements to target local security 
forces, government infrastructure, and the military through the employment of suicide 
bombers. From 2014–2018, data on IS-K kinetic operations in Afghanistan shows that 47% 
of IS-K suicide attacks targeted the state.204 Additionally, the group has become 
exponentially more lethal through the increased effectiveness of its operations. In 2015, 
IS-K suicide attacks resulted in 90 deaths; in 2017, that number grew to 688.205 IS-K 
conducted over 200 kinetic operations in Afghanistan from 2014–2018, resulting in over 
1,500 deaths.206   
IS-K operations in Pakistan were different. In early 2015, IS-K was transferring 
money to Pakistan via the hawala system which it would use to bolster recruiting efforts 
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and logistics.207 At that time, IS-K conducted limited attacks against the government and 
focused most of its efforts on Shia targets in the northwestern portion of the country. While 
Pakistani members of IS-K desired to attack the state, a functioning government and 
security apparatus along with an almost cooperative relationship between IS-K and the 
Pakistani ISI, made kinetic operations challenging. In late 2016, as tensions with the 
Pakistani ISI grew, IS-K began ramping up attacks against government and civilian targets. 
Giustiozzi explains that: 
By early 2017 a source in TKP [Tehrik-e Khilafat Pakistan] pointed out that 
IS-K was making progress in building a presence in Pakistan’s main cities, 
with about 1,200 members in Peshawar, 700 in Lahore, 240 in Islamabad 
and 750 in Quetta; at least 40 percent of its members in Pakistani territory 
were in cities at that point.208  
IS-K in Pakistan was certainly lethal but on a much smaller scale. From 2014–2018 
IS-K conducted 83 total attacks, of which 62% targeted the government, police, or military, 
and 18 of the 83 attacks were by suicide bombers. The total number of fatalities for the 
attacks within Pakistan was 706.209 
There were also indications of IS-Central’s involvement in developing IS-K’s 
media and propaganda bureau. In his analysis of captured IS-K media products, Daniel 
Milton explains that the materials were not specific to Afghanistan, but general information 
and training materials that applied to all of the IS enterprise. Analysis of these products 
and IS-Central’s media guidance, yielded that there was a direct link between IS-K’s media 
outlet and Amaq, an IS-Central unofficial or gray news agency, as well as the IS-Central 
leadership, which provided quality control and evaluation of media products. IS-Central 
required that media products and propaganda messages be approved by IS-Central before 
their release in order to maintain a common narrative and consistent message throughout 
the organization and its branches. Milton went on to write the fact that these “documents 
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were recovered during an operation targeting a senior Islamic State-Khorasan media 
official increases their value and supports the assumption that these documents were 
actively being utilized to shape the group’s media operations.”210  
D. OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Environmental 
Afghanistan has a long history of being the prototypical insurgent safe haven. 
Known as the “Graveyard of Empires,” history has proven that Afghanistan can be difficult 
to govern, control, and understand; all of these were contributing factors toward IS-
Central’s decision to expand into the country.211 Afghanistan was a logical staging point 
IS-K to begin operations in central Asia because the mountainous terrain provided IS-K 
with protection and Afghanistan’s central location within the region, provided IS-K, with 
access to the rest of Central Asia. IS-K chose Nangahar Province in eastern Afghanistan as 
its main basing location because of its proximity to the FATA in Pakistan, where IS-K has 
enjoyed freedom of maneuver, and mountainous terrain, which was outside the daily reach 
of Afghan security forces and generally ungoverned.212 As Jadoon explains: 
The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan can offer ISK an 
opportunity to exploit safe havens in ungoverned areas on both sides of the 
border as well as any seasonal dynamics. This means that any aggressive 
state-led actions on one side of the border can result in the dispersion of ISK 
militants rather than their elimination. Finally, a presence on both sides of 
the border offers greater opportunities to ISK to diversify its resources, 
benefit from cross-border smuggling, and set up a financial infrastructure in 
the broader shadow economy of the region.213 
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AF/PAK, but more specifically Afghanistan, was chosen as an appropriate location 
to host and provide refuge for IS-Central leadership as they were forced to flee Iraq and 
Syria.214 In IS-K’s grand strategy, Afghanistan is the primary operational area with the 
most advantageous safe haven locations. Pakistan, however, serves as the IS-K logistical 
base of operations.215  
2. Political 
Afghanistan was chosen as the footing for IS-K, because it is the weakest state in 
the region, with an ongoing armed conflict, and strategically located.216 However, perhaps 
the most substantial political opportunities exploited by IS-Central and IS-K were the 
internal fractures and rifts within the Taliban.217 Initially, IS-K had an amenable 
relationship with the Taliban. Seen as a relatively low threat, the Taliban tolerated IS-K 
and, in some cases, agreed to non-belligerence pacts with the group.218  
The Taliban’s renewed relationship with Iran, the increasing threat of IS-K, 
ideological differences, and competition for resources put the two organizations at odds.219 
IS-K’s strategic, albeit lofty, goal was to replace the Taliban and co-opt other insurgent 
organizations into a salafist jihad regional conglomerate.220 Frustration among AF/PAK 
Taliban commanders and soldiers, particularly those who had fought in Iraq and Syria, 
gave IS-K the right opportunity to move into the region.221  
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3. Timing  
In 2014, IS-Central decided that the time was right globally, to begin establishing 
the caliphate.222 Expansion to AF/PAK seemed to be an appropriate next front for several 
reasons. First, IS-Central recognized that it must seize the opportunity to capitalize on the 
successes in Iraq and Syria. Second, IS-Central had access to Afghan and Pakistani 
jihadists during their time fighting in Syria as early as 2013, which allowed IS to begin 
indoctrination and opened up a line of communication for early coordination and recruiting 
efforts in central Asia. Third, IS was aware of the fractures within the Taliban and 
discouraged members of the AF/PAK Taliban were intrigued by the IS brand. Additionally, 
the Quetta Shura, the political council comprised of decision makers within the Taliban 
leadership, was losing credibility.223 Initially, IS-K tried to build in roads with the Quetta 
Shura. This was seemingly an IS-K effort to build some social cohesion with local leaders 
and a move to appear less intimidating; however, IS-K never intended to make the Taliban 
or the Quetta Shura a partner in its efforts to expand and wage jihad across central Asia. 
IS-K always planned to supplant the Taliban and was likely using the early negotiations to 
buy time for IS-K to build its organization to eventually challenge the Taliban for jihadist 
supremacy in the region.224 
4. Demographics 
IS-K and IS-Central share Sunni Muslims as their target population. IS-K sought 
support and allegiance, voluntary or coerced, from Sunnis; however, IS-Central also 
focused on destroying the “near enemy” and launched attacks against Sunni Muslims, 
especially supporters of the Taliban.225 IS-K continued sectarian targeting of Shia Muslims 
particularly the Hazaras, a Persian ethnic Shia group that represents approximately 20% of 
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Afghanistan’s population.226 IS-K tended to attack religious and cultural sites of minority 
communities like the Hazaras and the Sufis in Pakistan.227 Additionally, IS-K’s external 
support from foreign donors and state sponsors had shaped some of the operations in terms 
of timing and focus of their attacks.228   
IS-K was considered a foreign organization when it arrived in AF/PAK. 
Afghanistan has historically been a hotbed of jihadist activity; however, the country has 
been generally inhospitable to revisionist jihadist groups like IS-K, who seek to fuel 
sectarian violence and remove or change longstanding social and economic constructs.229 
To overcome the initial perception of being an invading group, IS-K used its member, who 
hailed from all across Afghanistan, to recruit from their local areas. This tactic allowed IS-
K to manufacture the appearance of being indigenous and increased its influence in local 
areas.230   
E. ANALYSIS 
Based on the study of IS-K, it is clear that IS-Central conducted Unconventional 
Warfare in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is difficult to determine whether IS-K will be 
considered a successful operation for IS-Central; however, this also depends on the metric 
for success. IS-K has vast long term goals: 1) overthrowing the established governments 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as replacing the Taliban as the hegemonic jihadist 
actor in the region, 2) gaining exclusive control over the terrain in order to contribute to 
the growth of the Islamic caliphate, and 3) growing the IS-K military and become 
financially independent of foreign aid, so that it can extend operations into central Asia.231 
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These are far reaching, perhaps unattainable, objectives given the level of IS-K’s military 
capability and overall support in the region. Measuring success against these goals would 
likely make IS-K a potential failure.   
However, considering that IS-K operations have resulted in the disruption of two 
sovereign governments and the Taliban, development of safe-haven locations for IS-
Central leaders in exile, and a foothold in the region with access to additional resources, 
IS-K could be seen as an initial success. This, of course, was not without its struggles. IS-
K’s early internal organizational issues and rifts between Afghan and Pakistani leadership 
delayed meaningful progress for the group. IS-K’s initial hard lines on the implementation 
of Sharia, bans on the drug trade, and the practice of takfir (excommunication of Muslims 
who do not adhere to Sharia) created animosity among the population and alienated IS-K. 
However, recognizing the opportunity to demonstrate flexibility IS-K, likely with IS-
Central’s approval, showed its pragmatism and adjusted its stance on issues to gain support. 
There are three substantive lessons learned from the IS-K experiment. First, from 
its experience with JN, IS-Central recognized that remotely managing expansion is difficult 
and dedicated more resources to the task. IS-Central committed money, a Special 
Representative, advisors, auditors to ensure that IS-K was built as close to the IS-Central 
model as possible, and media support. Second, IS-K must be willing to negotiate in order 
to maintain support in Khorasan. IS-K’s practicality on extreme policies like takfir helped 
the group establish some credibility and demonstrated that it was willing to make some 
concessions. These exemptions are almost certainly temporary. Lastly, and perhaps the 
most noteworthy lesson, while IS-K is a product of IS-Central, it is also a proxy force for 
its various outside donors. IS-Central can claim that its influence and oversight led to IS-
K’s structure and ideology, but until IS-K is financially autonomous, it will also remain a 
tool for states with interests in the region. It is likely that allowing outside financial 
contributions is a necessary means to an end for IS-Central, which plans to eventually 
facilitate financial independence for all of its wilayats; but currently, IS resources are 
limited in light of its recent loses in Syria and Iraq.      
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V. CASE STUDY:  
ISLAMIC STATE—WEST AFRICA PROVINCE 
A. OVERVIEW  
There is sufficient evidence that IS-Central deliberately acted to support Islamic 
State-West Africa Province (ISWA) through UW. IS-Central formally recognized Islamic 
State-West Africa Province (ISWA) through an official announcement made by IS-Central 
spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, ISWA greatly increased its media capability, a 
trademark of IS-Central, and there were robust changes in ISWA tactics and the group’s 
organization.232 All of this suggests IS-Central's direct involvement in ISWA's creation, 
however, experts debate the extent to which ISWA is connected to IS-Central. As Jacob 
Zenn highlights in his examination of the literature regarding ISWA, some scholars believe 
ISWA is linked to IS-Central in name alone, while others believe ISWA is a legitimate 
wilayat that receives formal guidance and support from Baghdadi.233 To understand ISWA, 
we must also briefly examine Boko Haram, the group that eventually became ISWA. 
Mohammed Yusuf (Yusef) founded Boko Haram, officially known as Jama`at ahl 
al-sunna li-da`wa wa-l-qital (The Sunni Group for Preaching and Fighting), in 2002. 
Initially, Boko Haram, which translated means “Western education is taboo,” was 
considered a locally developed organization that used limited violence to achieve its aims; 
however, following Yusef’s death in 2009, Boko Haram went through a major transition 
and became an ultra-violent terrorist organization.234 Boko Haram (BH) became a 
household name in April 2014 after it infamously kidnapped 300 young girls from a school 
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in Chibok, Nigeria.235 By that point, BH had evolved into a significant insurgency that 
controlled terrain and population centers in Nigeria. Since 2009, BH has been responsible 
for the deaths of approximately 30,000 people and the displacement of an additional two 
million.236 The Global Terrorism Index labelled BH “the most deadly terrorist group in the 
world” in 2015.237  
IS-Central saw an opportunity in BH. BH was already a violent salafist group 
operating in an area with salafist civilian supporters.238 BH also has the organizational 
capacity to launch large military operations and control terrain.239 While reports differed 
regarding coordination between BH and IS-Central, there were some indications that BH 
leader Abubakar Shekau (Shekau) and Baghdadi discussed joining forces via written 
correspondence in 2014.240 Yet other reports stated that subordinate commanders within 
BH and the eventual leader of ISWA, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, conducted coordination with 
IS-Central on their own.241 Regardless, in March 2015, Shekau publicly offered his 
allegiance to IS. Five days later, IS accepted and announced the establishment of ISWA.242 
Since ISWA was formed, it has waxed and waned. ISWA went through a 
tumultuous IS-Central directed leadership change from Shekau to Abu Musab al-Barnawi 
(Barnawi) in 2016. Additionally, there was a split within the organization, which resulted 
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in two factions: one that is officially recognized by IS-Central and led by Barnawi, and the 
other which became the Shekau faction. Skekau’s group still claims to be loyal to IS-
Central but is not formally acknowledged nor has it been denounced by IS-Central.243     
B. THE POPULATION 
1. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a critical aspect of success for any insurgency and this was especially 
true for ISWA. Following the internal split creating Barnawi’s ISWA and Shekau’s faction, 
there was increased competition for legitimacy between the two groups.244 While the 
groups were not necessarily at war with each other, they occasionally had violent clashes, 
as each desired its own legitimacy.245 ISWA generated its legitimacy in three major ways: 
professionalism, propaganda (internal and external messaging), and success on the 
battlefield.  
IS-Central considered itself to be the vanguard for Sunni Muslims’ ascension 
around the world. Therefore, it was no surprise that it went to great lengths to ensure that 
ISWA conducted itself as professionally as its sponsor. Like IS-Central, ISWA promoted 
its religious credentials and utilized a deliberate indoctrination process, which, Abdulbasit 
Kassim describes as “internal study sessions,” to shape its membership. ISWA study 
sessions consisted of teaching and reading Islamic texts and religious guidance documents 
were translated into the local language.246 Study session materials and key messages were 
directed internally, for members of the organization, and externally, as recruiting tools. 
Jacob Olidort and Kassim describe the method that IS-Central used to oversee ISWA’s 
development:  
 
243 Robert Postings, “Nigeria’s Military Struggles with Islamic State: Part 1 – an Upsurge in Attacks,” 
The Defense Post, January 15, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/01/15/nigeria-military-struggles-
islamic-state-iswa-part-1-upsurge-in-attacks/. 
244 Zenn, “Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency”, vii. 
245 Crisis Group, “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province,” Crisis Group, 
May 16, 2019, 7, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-
west-africa-province. 
246 Zenn, “Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency,” 24–25. 
62 
The Islamic State-ization program of ISWAP is potent evidence that the 
leaders of the group are in constant communication with the Delegated 
Committee of the Islamic State (al-Lajna al-Mufawwada), “a select group 
of knowledgeable, upright individuals with perception and leadership skills 
delegated by the caliph for the supervision of all the Islamic State’s 
provinces, departments, committees, and offices.”247 
ISWA has also received media support from IS-Central. IS-Central highlighted 
ISWA activities and operations via its robust propaganda and media infrastructure. IS-
Central publicized successful ISWA military operations and appealing stories of ISWA 
activities to support the population through media outlets like al Naba, Amaq News 
Agency, and the IS-Central official Telegram channels.248 This support made it appear like 
ISWA had the same high quality, professional media capability as IS-Central.  
Additionally, ISWA gained legitimacy through its military capabilities and 
successful operations against state security forces. ISWA saw significant military defeat 
between 2015–2016 when the Nigerian government received essential assistance from the 
Multinational Joint Task Force, a unified coalition of military elements from neighboring 
nations.249 However, ISWA experienced a resurgence between 2017–2018 and earned 
several significant victories over state forces.250 With these successes, ISWA enjoyed 
renewed military prowess.  
2. Ideology 
Like IS-Central, ISWA is a Sunni Salafist group. Its roots are from BH, which was 
heavily influenced by Wahhabi practices from Saudi Arabian Islamic jurisprudence 
universities and clerics. Both ISWA and BH believed in enacting Sharia law across its 
territory in Nigeria and ousting the secular government. Like IS-Central, ISWA stoked 
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sectarian violence through the use of terrorist tactics to divide ethnic and religious groups. 
While BH has declared Shia and Sufi Muslims enemies, it also focused on targeting and 
persecuting the Nigerian Christian population.251  
Prior to becoming ISWA, BH's flagrant use of violence, in a way, became a part of 
its ideology. The removal of Shekau as the leader of ISWA, in 2016, was largely due to his 
commitment to extreme violence against civilians. In his brief historical overview of BH, 
Fergus Kelly writes, “Shekau’s ruthless brutality, his definition of takfir and what 
constituted apostasy, and his targeting of Muslims among other things, caused rifts to fester 
within the group.” 252 While it may be difficult to believe that a notoriously violent jihadist 
organization like IS-Central, would see Shekau’s methods as too violent, that was 
apparently the case. IS-Central realized that Shekau’s violence was alienating west African 
Muslims and, in an effort to win over some of the population, IS-Central directed ISWA to 
shift away from intense violence and polarizing activities. An example of this was seen in 
April 2018, when ISWA released several kidnapped female college students from Dapchi, 
Nigeria, after consultation with IS-Central. In a statement made by Abu Bashir, the head 
of the ISWA Shura council, he said the abduction of the women would portray ISWA in a 
negative light at a critical time when it was trying to win over Muslims in west Africa.253  
3. Grievances  
ISWA’s grievances reside with the state governments in west Africa, specifically, 
Nigeria but also Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.254 ISWA sought to overthrow secular 
governments and replace them with Islamic systems and Sharia law. From its roots in BH, 
ISWA also desired to put an end to Western education in the region, as it considered it to 
be against Islam. BH considered Western education to be “within schools which have been 
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established by missionaries which includes the education curriculum from elementary 
education to secondary schooling and institutes to national service to employment.”255  
ISWA also co-opted local popular grievances from the areas it began to control. An 
overall lack of governmental representation, essential services, medical care, and security 
were all common sources of frustration among civilians in the region. ISWA successfully 
leveraged these concerns and began systematically addressing them.256 ISWA was also 
cognizant of the population’s negative perceptions of groups like Shekau’s faction and 
other extremist organizations in the region. To present itself as a legitimate alternative, 
ISWA reportedly toned-down violence against civilians, limited forcible resource 
extraction and robbery, and focused the majority of its attacks on state and military 
targets.257  
4. Resources 
Reports indicated that ISWA was receiving some financial and training support 
from IS-Central until 2017, when IS-Central came under extreme duress in Iraq and 
Syria.258 Losing support from IS-Central likely only had a marginal impact on ISWA 
operations. ISWA always operated in areas with limited economic resources, generally 
poor people, and rudimentary infrastructure. As a result, the group became resilient and 
creative in ways to sustain itself.259 ISWA effectively leveraged control over local markets 
and imposed taxes on livestock, farming, and local goods within its territory. ISWA also 
used alternative methods to acquire funding and material resources such as kidnapping 
children from wealthy or well-known families for ransom and conducting confiscation 
check points; however, ISWA’s shift to build stronger relationships with the civilian 
population resulted in the decline of these activities. More recently, ISWA encouraged 
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trade between the group and the population to secure resources and shape local commerce. 
Fuel has been among ISWA’s top resource priorities in order to maintain its vehicle fleet, 
which enabled them to travel long distances to maintain control and govern large, sparsely 
populated areas in the region.260 Additionally, ISWA used battlefield recovery following 
raids and attacks, to obtain additional weapons, equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, 
and other resources to continue operations.261 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
1. Leadership 
Mohammed Yusuf, a Muslim cleric from Nigeria, was a member of the Izala 
(Arabic word for removing) sect of Islam who started on the path of Salafism as a student 
of Ja’far Adam, a notable Salafist preacher and graduate of the Islamic University in Media, 
Saudi Arabia.262 Yusuf learned from Adam and used his position within the Nigerian 
Muslim community to denounce western educational practices and the secular government 
of Nigeria.263 He sought to spread sharia throughout Nigeria, in opposition to what he 
believed to be a corrupt Nigerian government, and establish an Islamic state.264 Yusuf was 
killed while trying to escape police custody in 2009, opening the door for his successor, 
Shekau.265  
Following the death of Yusuf, Shekau saw an opportunity to seize control of the 
organization and seek vengeance for the members of BH who were killed by Nigerian 
security forces. He married one of Yusuf’s wives, adopted his children, and assumed his 
role as leader.266 Reports indicate that Shekau was a fearless battlefield leader with 
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unwavering extremist convictions. In a video recording from January 2012, Shekau said “I 
enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill—the way I enjoy killing chickens and 
rams.”267 Following Shekau assuming control of BH, the group took on his violent 
personality. BH's level of violence increased immediately as it retaliated against Nigerian 
security forces.268  
Shekau openly praised Baghdadi and IS-Central for their success in establishing a 
caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In August 2014, shortly after the Baghdadi declared the IS 
caliphate, Shekau announced that BH had also established a caliphate in Nigeria.269 Shortly 
after accepting Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to Baghdadi, the relationship between IS-
Central and Shekau became strained.270 IS did not approve of Shekau’s commitment to 
extreme violence and felt that he was alienating the population IS sought support from. As 
a result, in the August 2, 2016 issue of the IS newsletter, al Naba, IS announced that Shekau 
was no longer the leader of ISWA and that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the newly appointed 
emir of ISWA.271    
Shekau did not accept the change in leadership. Instead, ISWA split with one group 
remaining loyal to Shekau and the other following Barnawi.272 Barnawi was a logical 
choice for IS-Central. He is allegedly the son of Mohammed Yusef, which provided him 
with familial legitimacy. He is also a seasoned jihadist with leadership experience from his 
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As of May 2019, reporting indicated that ISWA has been successful in its attempts 
to control territory mainly because it did what the state was, unable or unwilling to do, 
govern. ISWA’s government initiatives were a shift from its earlier behavior. In 2017, 
Barnawi did not want the group tied to physical terrain. At that time, ISWA preferred the 
security of being mobile and able to transit through Nigeria and the surrounding safe 
havens in Niger and other areas.274 In many of the areas ISWA controlled, there had been 
no legitimate government presence or influence for a long period of time. As such, ISWA 
implemented systems to create “Islamic justice” and basic security, which, although violent 
in many circumstances, lowered crime in some areas and was generally seen as positive 
when compared to relative lawlessness.275 ISWA also opened schools for Islamic education 
and provided basic healthcare for locals. According to International Crisis Group’s study 
of ISWA, 
ISWA has at its command a number of medical specialists, both militants 
and captives, who serve not just fighters and their families, but also local 
civilians, sometimes for a fee, sometimes for free. The group procures 
medicine in raids on health centers or purchases it in Cameroon and 
Nigeria’s Yobe state. ISWA can organize the transfer of seriously ill 
patients to hospitals in neighboring countries.276  
ISWA did not discontinue its coercive means of control however, by providing 
services, security, and a legal system, ISWA cultivated a community of support from areas 
that were largely disregarded by the state.277  
3. Guerilla, Auxiliary, and Underground Networks 
ISWA’s governance capabilities allowed the organization to grow and expand its 
support networks through an increased number of followers; and, ISWA also leveraged 
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existing networks in the region. ISWA’s roots are with BH and, to some extent al Qaeda, 
which provided ISWA with options for support and operations. There is evidence that as 
far back as 2009, BH coordinated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al 
Shabaab for major attacks.278 The likelihood of ISWA continuing to coordinate with 
competitors like AQIM is low; however, ISWA has also utilized IS-Central related 
networks from Libya and other affiliates in Africa. According the International Crisis 
Group, “an unspecified number of Nigerian and West African militants who fought abroad 
for ISIS have reportedly joined ISWA and several civilians claim to have seen trainers of 
Arab origin in ISWA areas.” Additional reports from February 2019, claim that ISWA 
members from Baga, Nigeria, traveled to fight or train with IS in Libya.279 These reports 
indicated that on some level, ISWA is in communication with IS-Central’s other branches 
in the region. Another example of this is with the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), 
a newly recognized affiliate that operates in and around Mali. To some extent, IS-Central 
may have aligned ISGS under ISWA in order to establish clearer lines of communication 
and increase oversight of the group.280  
In terms of attacks and military operations, ISWA has focused on military targets 
to degrade the state’s legitimacy and gain control over terrain but, also to limit civilian 
casualties. ISWA has not completely ceased attacks against civilian targets but, it has 
attempted to concentrate civilian attacks on those that have some type of connection to 
“local officials, chiefs, vigilantes, and suspected informers.”281 In 2018, ISWA attacks 
against government targets were effective and gradually increased in frequency. Between 
January and July 2018, ISWA claimed only four attacks; however, between August and 
November 2018, ISWA claimed 23 attacks.282 Additionally, as of February 2019, it was 
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reported that ISWA overran 14 Nigerian military bases and handedly defeat Nigerian 
security forces on several occasions.283 State governments have typically not confirmed 
details of ISWA attacks, likely to protect their legitimacy in light of major military defeat; 
however, the lack of effective state counter-measures and shrinking resources will likely 
lead to a continuation of these trends.284  
D. OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Environmental 
While ISWA primarily operated in Nigeria, it was also active in Chad, Niger, and 
Cameroon.285 Weakened government infrastructure created porous borders between 
nations in the region which allowed ISWA to travel between states and create insurgent 
lines of communication. Additionally, there are two major factors that play in ISWA’s 
favor. First, the terrain is sparsely populated with large uninhabited areas throughout, 
which made it difficult for a weakened and under equipped state security apparatus to 
control. Second, the Nigerian military shifted its strategy to focus on static defense of 
military outposts, this allowed ISWA relative freedom of maneuver and the ability to 
choose the time and location of their attacks.286    
2. Political 
IS-Central’s decision to expand through ISWA was logical because it was an 
opportunity to exploit an ineffective governmental system. The lack of an effective state 
government, particularly in the far reaches of Nigeria, allowed ISWA to take root. ISWA 
capitalized on the pressure and free space created by the other militant groups that were 
operating in the area for years, making northeastern Nigeria, parts of Chad, Niger, and 
Cameroon, inhospitable for government forces and agencies. According to the Armed 
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Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), volatility, violence, militancy, and civil 
unrest in the region has steadily increased over the last several years which will likely allow 
for ISWA to maintain its foothold in the near term.287 ACLED also predicts that the Sahel 
region of Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Algeria) 
will continue to be a major geopolitical dilemma for the foreseeable future.288 
IS-Central also exploited turbulent political conditions internal to BH. In 2015, BH 
was the most active and violent jihadist organization in the world. During the time just 
before Shekau pledged allegiance to IS-Central, Shekau was feeling pressure from his sub-
commanders to join with IS-Central. At that point, IS-Central was close to the peak of its 
power within Iraq and Syria, eclipsing al Qaeda as the premier jihadist organization in the 
world. The other leaders within BH believed that aligning with IS-Central would provide 
them with leverage to eventually oust Shekau, whose violent ideology was becoming 
counter-productive. Shekau also realized that if he did not pledge his allegiance to 
Baghdadi, he might risk an internal uprising amongst his subordinates. Interestingly, 
Baghdadi might have been hesitant to acknowledge ISWA as a legitimate wilayat if Shekau 
was not in control. His name recognition, reputation, and conviction to jihad were some of 
the qualities that attracted IS-Central to BH in the first place.289  
3. Timing  
Brand management, more so than opportunities on the ground in Nigeria, dictated 
the timing IS-Central’s expansion to the area. In 2015, BH was beginning to cede territory 
to Nigerian security forces and the Multinational Joint Task Force. IS-Central, while in 
control of large parts of Syria and Iraq, began encountering resistance from Iraqi security 
forces and Iranian-backed militias, in places like Tikrit. The official connection between 
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BH and IS-Central provided both groups with a propaganda story to take attention off their 
struggles on the battlefield.290  
While the poor conditions within west Africa offered IS-Central opportunities to 
exploit, those conditions have been, and will likely remain, relatively unchanged for years. 
A lack of government response to major crises among the populations, the inability to 
prevent armed conflict and defeat internal threats, and non-existent economic opportunities 
allowed several insurgent groups to grow.  
4. Demographics 
ISWA sought support from the disenfranchised Sunni Muslim population in west 
Africa and, with the change to its population engagement strategy, ISWA grew a popular 
support base within the areas it controlled. There is little reported on how ISWA addressed 
Muslim minorities, Shias, and other religious groups in the region. ISWA’s operating area 
is generally inhabited by mainstream Nigerian Salafi Muslims. The Nigerian Salafi civilian 
population were routinely confrontational with non-Muslims and other Muslim groups, 
however, not all Nigerian Salafists are jihadists.291 Regardless, the Salafi population, 
disparate living conditions, and a lack of state governance, provided ISWA with a 
hospitable environment to operate. 
Civilians did not appear to see ISWA as a foreign organization. This is likely due 
to its local roots from BH. On this point it should be highlighted that IS-Central did not 
attempt to spread ISWA outside of its core areas in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. 
There are several IS-Central franchises across north and west Africa, which is likely a 
reflection of IS-Central’s understanding of the unique cultures and ethnic groups in the 
region and their experience in expanding in other locations.292  
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ISWA has proven to be a formidable force on the west African battlefield. Its 
routine defeat of Nigerian security forces, ability to control terrain, and spectacular 
victories have provided IS-Central with a pressure release as it experienced defeats in Iraq 
and Syria.293 ISWA has given IS-Central fuel for its robust propaganda machine to take 
some of the focus off its territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria. There is substantial potential 
for ISWA to remain in west Africa given the lack of effective government response, the 
attrition of security forces, and the poor counterinsurgency strategy employed by the state.    
ISWA’s methods of governance developed significantly over time. There are two 
potential take-aways from this evolution of ISWA’s behavior. First, IS-Central’s guidance 
to ISWA has likely become more informed by its experiences in Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan. Overly strict and swift implementation of Sharia law resulted in some 
negative effects, particularly in securing support and cooperation from the population. As 
such, ISWA has recognized that it needs to be pragmatic at times and become a more 
adaptable organization. These practices have shown to be successful. Second, ISWA 
understands the competition it is in with other jihadi groups. ISWA is competing for 
resources and support with organizations that have been overly violent and oppressive of 
civilians. Modifying its behavior to avoid harsh treatment of civilians has increased 
ISWA’s popularity in comparison to competitors and the state government.    
There is one major outstanding vulnerability with ISWA and that is al Qaeda’s 
ability to potentially co-opt the group. Barnawi has roots in BH from his family lineage 
and he was chosen as the west Africa emir by Baghdadi; however, prior to joining ISWA, 
Barnawi was a member of Ansaru. Ansaru is considered al Qaeda’s affiliate in Nigeria and 
if IS-Central continues to suffer major defeats or is otherwise unable to direct and support 
ISWA from afar, it may provide al Qaeda with an opportunity to move in.294  
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VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
This research has used a theory of UW to examine three distinct case studies of IS 
expansion. While the level and type of support varies across and within each case, it is 
clear that IS has used its own version of UW to expand. Through IS sponsored UW, the 
organization has skillfully created the beginnings of its global caliphate, by adopting and 
supporting unique local jihadist groups, in regions that IS has identified as critical. IS first 
chose to expand to Syria because it was a country in the Islamic heartland with a Sunni 
majority population and an authoritarian government. Afghanistan was the birthplace of 
modern jihad and the keystone for further expansion into Asia. West Africa was a 
burgeoning jihadist landscape that provided IS the freedom to maneuver through vastly 
uncontrolled space.  
A. SIMILARITIES 
Cross comparison of the three case studies yields several similarities. Predictably, 
in each case, the groups effectively co-opted local grievances and sought to implement a 
version of the IS-Central model of government. Additionally, there are four other relevant 
conditions that IS-Central used during its decision-making process and strategy 
implementation: 1) exploit the maneuver space created by failed or failing governments, 
2) manipulate fractures within sponsored groups to assert control, 3) allow limited 
ideologically flexibility and pragmatism for  critical issues, and 4) leverage favorable 
geography and maximize safe havens.   
First, each of the target countries had a failed or failing political, governmental, and 
security systems. Syria’s civil war, the inability of the central government to secure and 
administer the eastern portion of the country, and ineffective essential services systems, 
created a vacuum for JN to fill. Likewise, in Afghanistan, over a decade of war, vast under-
governed space and the lack of governmental presence, along with the Taliban’s inability 
to be everywhere the government was not, gave IS-K the opportunity to establish itself. 
Nigeria’s war-torn northeast region had little military presence and the security forces 
present were under-supplied and minimally manned. ISWA successfully took control from 
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the Nigerian government in that area and replaced the void that was already present with 
effective solutions.  
The groups that IS-Central chose to sponsor were relatively effective but, more 
importantly, each had internal dynamics that could be manipulated in IS-Central’s favor. 
From the beginning, JN desired to be seen as a unifier of Syrians against their common 
enemy, the Assad government. In this way, IS-Central supported JN as it co-opted 
struggling, less organized, less effective, and under-supported groups in Syria. In 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, IS-Central recruited from the very organization it hoped to 
depose, the Taliban. Fears of Taliban leadership reaching a negotiated settlement with the 
Afghan government drove many fighters and some leaders to IS-K. IS-Central and leaders 
within ISWA used internal fractures to push Shekau toward pledging allegiance to 
Baghdadi. IS-Central used its leverage to remove Shekau and replace him with Barnawi, a 
leader it could control.  
IS-Central franchises appeared to be pragmatic and surprisingly flexible in their 
stance on some ideological issues. JN pushed a nationalist narrative and supported it with 
action that allowed it to build alliances and partnerships with other jihadist groups. JN also 
masked its affiliation with ISI to gain support from the population after it realized that IS-
Central’s extreme religious ideology would not be well received by the moderate Syrian 
Muslim population. In Afghanistan, IS-K’s pragmatism on extreme policies like takfir and 
the banning of opium related products, helped the group establish rapport with the tribes 
during tenuous times. ISWA also appeared to be reasonable as it tempered its use of 
violence against civilians gain favor with the population.  
Geographic considerations also played a role in IS-Central’s decision calculus. IS-
Central chose locations that were geographically advantageous for their operations. Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Nigeria all had porous borders which the groups exploited to facilitate 
the flow of logistics and personnel. Additionally, it allowed for the groups to transit out of 
their immediate operational areas if it became necessary to avoid pressure from the states’ 
counterinsurgency effort.  
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B. DIFFERENCES 
The differences within and across the cases make each unique. While all three 
groups sought support from Sunni Muslim populations, in each instance, there were distinct 
ethnic and cultural variations. In Syria, JN dealt with a majority Sunni Arab population, 
which as a Sunni Arab organization, IS-Central was comfortable with. Additionally, IS-
Central’s roots in Iraq and the support it received from Syria during the war in Iraq provided 
the group with long-standing support networks. In Afghanistan, Sunni Muslims were 
tribally affiliated, which added a degree of complexity. Lastly, in Nigeria, ISWA operated 
in an area that was dominated by mainstream Salafists, which minimized some ideological 
differences between the population and ISWA. 
Timing for each case was also different. Baghdadi recognized that the chaos that 
resulted from the Arab Spring and subsequent Syrian Civil War created an opening that IS-
Central could capitalize on. The timing in this case was based on recognition of opportunity 
for offensive expansion after IS-Central had reestablished itself in Iraq. In Afghanistan, IS-
Central sought to capitalize on its success in Iraq and Syria, but also it also realized that it 
needed to prepare additional safe havens for IS-Central leadership once the caliphate 
collapsed. ISWA provided both BH and IS-Central with positive momentum during a 
period when both groups were experiencing negative operational outcomes.  
Lastly, each case highlighted different types of leadership. Jolani was handpicked 
by Baghdadi to lead JN and the IS-Central push into Syria. Jolani is a capable leader who 
has proven to be difficult to target and, perhaps, even more difficult to control. Jolani still 
leads JN’s rebranded organization HTS, having ideologically split from IS-Central and al 
Qaeda to pursue his own vision for his organization in Syria. An experienced and effective 
Coalition targeting apparatus has forced IS-K through a high rate of leadership turnover. 
In addition, the changes in leadership and disagreements between the Afghan and Pakistani 
members of IS-K has led to challenges for the group. ISWA has experienced interesting 
and challenging leadership dynamics of their own. Shekau was named the first emir of 
ISWA but removed a year later in favor of Barnawi. Shekau felt that there was the potential 
for an insurrection with the group in 2015, and, while Barnawi has not appeared to be 
challenged, there is always the possibility with organizations like ISWA.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
Given this theory of UW and analysis of IS-Central’s UW campaigns in Syria, 
Afghanistan, and west Africa, it is clear that IS-Central is arguably one of the most prolific 
contemporary practitioners of UW. From the author’s perspective, the most significant 
aspect of this research has been the discovery of how UW has evolved from what we, in 
the United States Special Forces community, consider UW. Much of the U.S. perspective 
of UW is based off examples from the Jedburgh’s efforts to disrupt Nazi forces during 
World War II or the use of U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan, to support the 
Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. Scholars and practitioners within the 
traditionalist UW camp would likely disagree with much of the analysis within this thesis 
because it does not cleanly fit within Jedburgh or Northern Alliance like examples. 
Traditionalists would most certainly take issue with the assertion that IS, a group that many 
would label a non-state actor or terrorist organization, can conduct UW at all. To them, 
UW is reserved for states to execute in pursuit of national interests. However, based on the 
examination of how IS has expanded outside of Iraq, through the use of sponsored groups 
conducting guerilla warfare and subversion, against state governments or occupying 
powers, it is difficult to say that IS is not conducting UW.  
In each case, IS actions fit with the U.S. definition of UW.295 In Syria, IS-Central 
enabled JN to coalesce various jihadist organizations, for the purpose of overthrowing the 
Syrian government and other factions occupying areas within Syria, through the use of 
operational and support networks, and guerilla warfare. In Afghanistan, IS-Central enabled 
IS-K to overthrow the Afghan government and, in areas it controlled, the Taliban, through 
similar networks and guerilla warfare. Likewise, in west Africa, IS-Central enabled ISWA 
to overthrow the secular government of Nigeria and, disrupt or coerce other jihadist groups 
in the region, through the use of its networks and guerilla warfare.  
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The degree to which IS-Central supported each expansion effort was different. This 
variance in support was based on timing, capability, resources, and access to the sponsored 
group. In the case of JN, IS-Central took a more direct approach by using Syrian members 
of the organization to lead the campaign. In Afghanistan and west Africa, reporting is 
mixed; however, it is clear that IS-Central devoted resources to IS-K and ISWA in order 
to ensure their success. In summary, perhaps the most beneficial lesson to be learned from 
this research is that UW encompasses many things and can be effective in many ways. To 
strictly limit its use to cases like the Jedburghs in World War II or Afghanistan in 2001, 
creates a strategic environment where UW may be the correct solution; however, UW 
might be overlooked because of narrow perspective. As Kilcullen writes, “while UW 
remains a viable, low-cost method of indirect warfare, some of the assumptions 
underpinning traditional UW have diverged from reality in the last two decades.”296 To 
that end, as the battlefield has changed, so must our understanding and appreciation of UW.    
It remains unclear as to how successful IS’s initiatives will be over the long term, 
IS-Central used their UW strategy to secure footholds in foreign lands, then seized, held, 
and governed territory in areas outside of Iraq. IS deliberately chose groups to support, 
locations to expand, and exploited opportunities. IS used media to perform subversion and 
psychological operations, leveraged operational and support networks, conducted guerilla 
warfare, and utilized terrorism to achieve its political and military objectives.297 IS-
Central’s successful implementation of its UW strategy should not be surprising. The move 
to expand fits within its stated ideology to create an Islamic caliphate using methods 
evaluated and tested in Iraq.  
Although the group has gone through several name and leadership changes, the 
U.S. and its coalition of partner nations has been at war with IS-Central since 2003. The 
question now shifts from how and why IS-Central expanded outside of its core area in Iraq 
to how does the U.S. defeat IS-Central or prevent it from continuing its expansion. The 
 
296 David Kilcullen, “The Evolution of Unconventional Warfare,” Scandinavian Journal of Military 
Studies 2, no. 1 (June 20, 2019): 61, https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.35. 
297 Craig Whiteside, “Session Three, Panel 6: Information Warfare and the War on ISIS” (January 
2017), https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/kcsc-panel-6?in=warstudies/sets/kcsc-conference. 
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commonalities among these case studies may provide planners and intelligence analysts 
with a framework for identifying groups and locations that may be attractive to IS-Central. 
It is possible that studying where and why IS-Central may direct its next UW campaign, 
may help the U.S. and coalition of partners prevent or defeat it.  
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